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Abstract
  
 This work offers the U. S. military and national security structure a methodology 
to analyze tension within signed networks based on social balance theory, presents a 
process to partition a signed network to identify likely subsets within the network, and 
pinpoints unique actors and relationships based on the structure of the network.  
Relationships identified to cause increased tension within the network are discovered 
and analyzed.  Identifying this tension provides analysts with insight into the 
complexities of the network and potential relationships to target to stabilize or 
destabilize a network.  Two Social Network Analysis models have been developed 
analyzing the relationships of key actors associated with the 2012-2013 conflict in 
Northern Mali.  Relations between the terrorist group Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), several Tuareg organizations, the Malian government and other key actors are 
assessed, both prior to and immediately following French and other international forces 
involvement beginning in January 2013.  The potential effectiveness of the developed 
methodology is demonstrated, through the Mali example, in the identification of a 
specific relationship between two organizations as being under tension to change; 
subsequently one of the organizations split, reducing the tension and irreversibly 
changing the network. 
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A NETWORK ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL BALANCE IN CONFLICT IN THE 
MAGHREB 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
A main objective of the National Security strategy released by the Office of the 
President of the United States (OPOTUS) is to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa’ida 
and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world.” 
((OPOTUS), Office of the President of the United States, 2010, p. 19)  In addition to 
groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, large al-Qa’ida affiliated groups are active in Egypt 
(Egyptian Islamic Jihad – EIJ), Iraq (al-Qaeda in Iraq – AQI/ The Islamic State of Iraq – ISI), 
Yemen (al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula – AQAP), Somalia (Al Shebaab), and the 
Maghreb (al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb – AQIM) (Byman, 2012).  Since 2001, the 
United States and its allies have been conducting overseas contingency operations 
against a variety of terrorist groups.  This conflict has manifested most obviously in the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  American soldiers withdrew from Iraq in 2011 and are 
projected to end combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014.   
Even as these kinetic conflicts near an end, the mission of disrupting, 
dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda around the world is still necessary and apparent.  
Future efforts in completing this mission will require the U.S. to 
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 strengthen our own network of partners to disable al-Qa’ida’s financial, 
human, and planning networks; disrupt terrorist operations before they 
mature; and address potential safe-havens before al-Qa’ida and its 
terrorist affiliates can take root ((OPOTUS), Office of the President of the 
United States, 2010, p. 21).   
Due to the overwhelming military superiority of the United States and its allies, any 
conflicts against al-Qa’ida affiliated groups are likely to be counterinsurgencies. 
United States joint doctrine defines Counterinsurgency (COIN) as military, 
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government 
to defeat an insurgency (Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms).  An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the 
overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed 
conflict (Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms).  Since 2006 the United States Army has published two new Field 
Manuals on COIN, FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency and FM 3-24.2: Tactics in 
Counterinsurgency.  In the forward of FM 3-24, Generals Petraeus and Amos state that 
“all insurgencies, even today’s highly adaptable strains, remain wars amongst the 
people.”  Elsewhere FM 3-24 states:  
Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and 
counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its 
governance or authority as legitimate…. Political and military leaders and 
planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity (2006, p. 
1_1) 
 
This quote demonstrates that COIN is essentially a fight for the people.  To be 
successful, all aspects of government (as well as applicable non-governmental 
organizations) must garner a cultural understanding and create a strategy that 
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incorporates the complex relationships of the local population.  FM 3-24.2 states: “Since 
all wars are fought in and amongst a population, the Army seeks to develop an ability to 
understand and work with a culture for its Soldiers and leaders (p. 1_18).”  In dealing 
with complex social environments, the U.S. must be aware of and capable of exploiting 
the social balance, comprising alliances and adversarial relationships, among the 
population.  Currently, the DOD addresses the social balance of a population in an ad 
hoc manner leading to misunderstandings of the human environment.  Actions resulting 
from these poor assessments can exacerbate existing tensions, create new rifts, and 
further damage relationships resulting in detrimental effects to U.S. objectives.  This 
thesis presents an analytical approach to address the need to better understand the 
interconnected relations of people in an area of interest.  While this methodology can 
be applied to any area of the world, Mali is used as a case study due to the unrest in the 
region.  This unrest has been exhibited by the coup and subsequent conquering of 
Northern Mali by AQIM and affiliated jihadist groups, followed by the retaking of 
Northern Mali’s main cities by the French, Malian and African forces.  The situation in 
Mali is likely to descend into a counterinsurgency environment with AQIM and other 
extremist groups operating in the vast desert against Malian and international forces 
that control the cities. 
1.2 The Adversary 
AQIM is an Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organization born in Algeria that now 
operates across much of North and West Africa.  It is focused on establishing an Islamic 
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Caliphate and conducting jihad against anyone opposed to their mission (Benjamin, 
2012).  Recently AQIM and affiliated groups have become popular in the western media 
due to their kidnapping of Westerners for ransom, for capturing and controlling 
Northern Mali, for their alleged involvement in the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya on 
September 11, 2012, and the attack on an Algerian natural gas plant in January 2013 
that resulted in 37 hostage and 29 militant deaths.  Since 2008, AQIM is reported to 
have raised tens of millions of dollars through kidnapping operations alone (Cohen, 
2012).  The territory captured in Northern Mali, roughly the size of Texas or France, 
provided Al-Qaeda with its largest sanctuary since Afghanistan prior to 2002.  The 
actions of the Islamists in Northern Mali, instilling Shari’a law and destroying UNESCO 
historical and religious sites have raised alarms and harkened comparisons to the 
Taliban’s actions in Afghanistan prior to September 11, 2001.  An Amnesty International 
report released on 20 September 2012, states nearly 436,000 people have fled Northern 
Mali for the south or neighboring countries (Amnesty International, 2012).  Additionally, 
militant groups are well armed thanks to the recent fall of Gaddafi in nearby Libya and 
the capture of Malian army stockpiles (Arieff & Johnson, August 2012).  The 
combination of extreme ideology, a sanctuary for training, a good financial basis, and 
large amounts of weapons and experience makes AQIM and other extreme Islamic 
militant groups a serious threat to the region and the world.   
 Throughout 2012 the international community assessed the situation and 
considered plans to regain the lost territory.  In January 2013, as the Islamists 
threatened to move further south towards the capital of Bamako, France intervened in 
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the conflict.  Intense fighting has taken place, first between local groups, and more 
recently against the international forces.  As this conflict unfolds, a cultural study of the 
people of Mali will provide needed insight on the complex relationships at work in the 
region.  In the forward of FM 3-24, Generals Petraeus and Amos state that “conducting a 
successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, 
well-informed, culturally astute leaders.”   
 This thesis presents a methodology that, when properly applied, will assist 
strategic leaders by providing insight into the complex intricacies of an area of interest.  
The approach presented in this study provides an analytic process that detects alliances 
present in the operating environment, identifies unique actors, such as mediators, and 
pinpoints vulnerable relationships based on the structure of the network.   
1.3 Problem Approach 
Many studies have been conducted attempting to identify statistically significant 
factors which can be used to properly predict upcoming ethnic conflicts (Szayna, 2000; 
O'Brien, 2002; Goldstone, et al., 2010).  However, once a country or region is identified 
as being at risk, few models are capable of evaluating the multifarious relations that 
exist within that area.  Network analysis often only considers if a relationship exists.  If 
two actors have a relationship then a connection between them is drawn.  In reality, 
however, people have both positive and negative relations.  A much different 
relationship exists if two actors like each other than if they dislike each other.  
Particularly in an environment where there is obvious tension, the type of relationship 
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needs to be considered when conducting an analysis on a network in order to gather 
information on how relationships affect the network as a whole.   
Once positive/negative relationship data is collected, a signed adjacency matrix 
is constructed from the data and a directional signed network is created.  Since most 
real-world large networks are unbalanced, Heider’s structural balance theory (Heider, 
1946) can be used to recognize and study unbalanced relationships.  If a relationship 
that causes imbalance does not change, then it is a source of tension within the 
network.  As relationships in the network are identified as having the potential to 
change to make the network more (or less) balanced, they can be evaluated by 
intelligence analysts.  If these relationships can and do change as predicted, then the 
network can become more (or less) balanced, resulting in less (or more) tension and 
cause for conflict in the region.  Making a hostile network less balanced could result in 
increasing tension within the network and achieve destabilizing goals.  Additionally, the 
network can be separated into subsets thereby identifying important alliances, enemies 
and mediators. To aid the analysis, a balance index will indicate how balanced the 
network is and centrality measures can identify key actors within the network.   
A balanced signed network can be partitioned into two distinct subsets where 
each subset has positive relations within the subset and negative relations with each 
actor in the other subset (Harary, 1953).  When a signed network is unbalanced, 
clustering of more than two groups can be done if the network has no cycles which have 
exactly one negative arc (Davis, 1967).  The Doriean/Mrvar algorithm can be used to 
determine if a network is balanced, how balanced it is at a given number of subsets, and 
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identifies the best number of subsets to partition a network into.  Blockmodeling can 
then be used to identify which relationships cause imbalance within the network.  
Relaxed blockmodeling is also used to account for factors other than structural balance 
in the model.  This method relaxes the requirements of structural balance to allow for 
the grouping of actors who have identical or similar ties to and from all actors in other 
groups.  These techniques can aid in identifying alliances or analogous actors by 
grouping them into appropriate subsets based on their relations (Wasserman & Faust, 
1994, p. 396).  Additionally, it identifies specific relationships that may be vulnerable to 
change or potential misrepresentations within the network. 
1.4 Assumptions 
Like most models, this model is only as good as the data that is collected and 
analyzed.  Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) should be included in the data collection and 
assist in validation and verification of the model to ensure that substantive conclusions 
are drawn.  The proposed model is designed to provide insight to analysts; it should not 
be used as the ground truth or for operational decisions based solely on its results.  A 
number of assumptions are made to enable the methodology of the model.  First, 
human behavior is assumed to be rational.  If it is not rational, then it is unpredictable 
and therefore impossible to accurately model.  In most situations humans make rational 
decisions; however, in some situations this assumption may not hold true.  Another 
assumption is that a proper decision making process was conducted to identify the 
appropriate groups, actors or nodes to include into the model.  Depending on the 
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application, actors could be individuals, tribes, ethno linguistic or other people groups 
that are influential within the societal network.  When appropriate data is unavailable, 
subject matter experts (SMEs) must provide historical and cultural data on the 
relationships between cultural groups within the region of interest.  This data consists of 
positive and negative relationships between the groups in the study.   
1.5 Overview and Format 
 Having defined the problem and outlined the general analysis approach, this 
thesis next provides a review of the supporting literature on the topics covered.  
Chapter Two presents an overview of AQIM, highlighting its structure and leaders, 
regional dynamics, affiliates and off-shoots, a historical context to the conflict in Mali, as 
well as United States efforts in the region.  Additional topics within Chapter Two include 
dark social networks, graph theory, structural balance theory, identifying subsets within 
signed networks, measuring imbalance, partitioning a signed network, and social 
network analysis metrics applicable to signed networks.  Chapter Three develops the 
methodology for partitioning and assessing signed social networks.  Chapters Four and 
Five apply the methodology to the situation in Mali by analyzing the relationships 
between militant groups within Mali.  Conclusions are made in Chapter Six as well as 
recommendations for further research. 
           
2-1 
 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of AQIM and the conflict in Mali, outlines the 
basic framework of Social Network Analysis (SNA), and highlights relevant previous work 
done on Social Networks, signed graphs, and social balance theory that support the 
development and application of the methodology used with the thesis.  The author 
directs readers to Wasserman and Faust (Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
Applications, 1994), Hanneman (Introduction to Social Network Methods, 2005), and 
Scott and Carrington (The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis, 2011) for more 
detailed explanations of SNA methods.   
2.2 Background and Overview of Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) and the Conflict in Mali 
The roots of AQIM can be traced back to the turmoil in Algeria in the 1980’s and 
1990’s.  Having gained their independence from France in 1962, Algeria had been 
functioning as a one party system until President Bendjedid introduced political reforms 
including multi-party elections (Harmon, 2010, p. 13).  As a result, the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS) became Algeria’s first official Islamic political party in 1989.  The FIS won the 
municipal elections in 1990 and a majority of the 1991 first round elections.  In 1992, 
prior to the second round elections in which the FIS was predicted to win again, a 
military junta seized power. The military deposed President Bendjedid, outlawed the 
FIS, imprisoned its leaders and detained thousands of Islamic activists in Saharan 
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concentration camps (Harmon, 2010, p. 14).  The denial of a democratically elected 
Islamic government, coupled with the influence of extreme Islamists wanting to 
establish an Islamic caliphate, resulted in a blossoming movement of militant Islam 
within Algeria in the early 1990’s.   
At this same time in Algeria there were Islamic extremists returning from 
Afghanistan, following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.  An estimated 1,000 to 1,500 
mujahedeen who fought in Afghanistan returned to Algeria after Pakistan ended 
mujahedeen operations in their country (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 2).  These Afghan fighters 
returned to Algeria with military skills to incorporate into training camps and extremist 
plans to evoke an Islamic revolution (Dahlburg, 1996; Compass, 1994).  The combination 
of returning Afghan mujahedeen and domestic Islamic persecution by the Algerian 
government provided the environment for the formation of the armed Islamic terrorist 
groups. 
In the early part of the 1990’s, many different militant factions were fighting the 
government of Algeria.  In late 1992 several factions, which included former Afghan 
fighters, combined to form the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 3).  The 
GIA began conducting attacks in 1993 and practiced an extreme version of Islam called 
Salafism1.  The GIA made a number of high profile attacks including a hijacking of an Air 
                                                     
1 Salafism called for a return to traditional Islam, the Qur’an, and the practices of the 
prophet Mohammed or the Sunnah (Botha, p. 12).  At the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire Muslim scholars became concerned that the Muslim world was falling behind 
the rest of the world.  Attributing the decline to a departure from the straight path of 
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France flight from Algiers to Paris in 1994.  Attacks on the civilian populace caused a rift 
between the FIS and the GIA causing the FIS to form their own armed group, the Islamic 
Salvation Army (AIS), in 1994.  The goal of the AIS was to overthrow the Algerian 
government to allow FIS to establish an Islamic government.   The FIS wanted to 
separate themselves from the violence that the GIA was conducting on civilian targets.  
The AIS leadership believed in attacking military and government targets only and 
allowed for the opportunity to return to the political process (Harmon, 2010, p. 14).  
Conversely, the GIA believed in using violent means to establish a strict Islamic 
government in Algeria and were not interested in a political process. 
As the GIA became more extreme, their focus switched from overthrowing the 
Algerian government to their opposition with the AIS (Harmon, 2010, p. 14).  In 1996, 
the GIA declared war on the AIS and in 1997 issued a fatwa (Islamic ruling) condemning 
the entire population of Algeria for not supporting them.  In 1996 and 1997, there were 
over forty separate massacres of civilians, most attributed to the GIA (Harmon, 2010, p. 
14).  By the end of the 1990’s, the GIA had lost much of the power they once had due to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Islam, a revival of Islamic thought took place leading to Salafism.  The most extreme 
form of Salafism, the kind practiced by jihadists, is unwilling to work within the secular 
political system to achieve their objectives.  These extremists believe that the legitimacy 
of Muslim governments is based on Shari’a law and that those people that do not follow 
it explicitly are unlawful and must be removed (Botha, June 2008, p. 17).   Using this 
same logic, extremists often attack fellow Muslims, even though it is explicitly not 
permitted in Islam.  They justify their attacks by declaring people or governments as 
non-Muslim if their actions or statements fall beyond the framework of Islam. 
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the success of the army’s “eradication” policy against terrorists, the GIA’s increasingly 
erratic and extremist leadership, and its violent tactics particularly against civilians 
(Cristiani & Fabiani, 2011).  Although the GIA was never officially dissolved, it was an 
inept organization by 2001 (Kohlmann, 2007, p. 12) and is no longer on the State 
Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). 
While some mujahedeen decided to accept the amnesty offered by the Algerian 
government when the GIA self destructed, not all were willing to give up the fight.  In 
1998, former GIA member Hassan Hattab founded the new group, the Salafist Group for 
Call and Combat (GSPC).2  The GSPC wished to return to the goal of removing the 
Algerian government and instating a fundamental Islamic government while avoiding 
the unnecessary targeting of civilians.  Within a few years the GSPC grew in numbers to 
around 3,000, as former GIA and AIS fighters unified under the common goal 
(Kohlmann, 2007, p. 13).  In 2003 Hattab was removed from leadership because he 
wanted to maintain focus in Algeria as opposed to the global jihad of Al-Qa’ida (Botha, 
June 2008, p. 64).  This demonstrated a rift in the group and shift in the group’s focus 
from the near enemy (Algeria) to the far enemy (France and the United States).  The 
new leader Nabil Sahrawi (a.k.a. Abu Ibrahim Mustafa) was killed in 2004.  Abdelmalik 
Dourkdal (a.k.a. Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud) became the next leader and saw the 
transition of the organization from GSPC to AQIM.  There were many factors that led the 
                                                     
2 The Salafist Group for Call and Combat is also known as the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat or Le Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat in French. 
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GSPC to join the Al-Qa’ida network.  Undoubtedly, the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
were a contributing factor to the transformation to global jihadism.  There is a great 
deal of evidence that the GSPC and Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) had a relationship to recruit 
Algerians to fight in Iraq (Kohlmann, 2007, pp. 17-18).  Some recruits were sent to Iraq, 
while others were kept in Algeria to increase the manning of the GSPC. 
On 11 September 2006, Al-Qa’ida’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
announced the merger of GSPC with Al-Qa’ida.  In January 2007 the GSPC announced 
their new name: Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb.  The name change reflected the 
evolution of the goal of the organization from local to global jihad.  The group then 
began to target foreign countries and operate outside the borders of Algeria, especially 
in Mali and Mauritania (Harmon, 2010, p. 16).   
Between 2008 and 2011, the Global Terrorism Database lists 184 attacks 
attributed to AQIM.  Nearly 84% of the attacks took place in Algeria, many of them 
against government, military or police forces (see Figure 1) (Global Terrorism Database, 
2012).   
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Figure 1: AQIM Attacks by Target: 2008-2011 (Global Terrorism Database, 2012) 
In 2007, AQIM had three attacks in Algeria that claimed over 30 lives including a 
double car bombing against a bus and a UN building.  In August 2008 over 100 people 
were killed in blasts east of Algiers.  Italian, Spanish, French, German, Canadian, Swiss 
and British civilians have been kidnapped over the past 5 years.  Several hostages were 
killed after failed raids trying to save them.  However, most hostages were released 
after negotiations.  Reports state that significant ransom payments and the release of 
imprisoned AQIM individuals have been commonly provided to AQIM in return for 
western hostages.  In July 2012, two Spaniards and an Italian woman were released by 
MUJAO, an AQIM affiliated group, after being held since October 2011.  An AQIM 
spokesman said that they received $18.3 million and one person released from a 
Mauritania prison (AFP, 2012).  An estimated $89 million has been paid to AQIM 
between 2004 and 2011 (Blair, 2013). 
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Grynkewitch and Reifel (November 2006) established a model to determine the 
finances of the GSPC.  While their work was conducted in 2006 on the GSPC, many of 
their assumptions hold true today for AQIM.  Table 1 describes the projected income 
sources from Grynkewitch and Reifel with the exception of the High Value 
Kidnapping/Individual value.  The High Value Kidnapping/Individual value listed in the 
table is based on the approximately six million dollar per person reportedly paid for the 
Spanish and Italian hostages released in July 2012 and is about twice the value 
calculated by Grynkewitch and Reifel.  The model that Grynkewitch and Reifel 
developed came up with the recommendation for Algeria to attempt to decrease GSPC’s 
(AQIM’s) ability to smuggle because it was a large portion of their income.  However, as 
they have been able to obtain larger amounts of ransom money than Grynkewitch and 
Reifel predicted, smuggling may now be less important than kidnappings.  In the past a 
large portion of smuggling was believed to be cigarettes.  However, in recent years 
there have been reports and some evidence of cooperation with Latin American drug 
cartels (UPI, 2010).  It is believed that drugs come in through Mauritania, are trafficked 
through the porous trade routes of the Sahara under protection of AQIM and other 
groups, and end up in Europe.  If this is true, then AQIM is likely receiving large amounts 
of cash and weapons from a previously unrealized source.   
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Table 1: Projected AQIM Income Sources and Amounts 
 
2.2.1  AQIM Structure. 
 
Figure 2: GSPC Zones of operations (Source: Botha p. 46) 
Income Source
$5,000 Local Extortion/ Incident
$5,000 Local Kidnapping/ Incident
Food & Shelter Local Populace
$2,750,000 Annual Smuggling
$6,000,000 High Value Kidnapping/individual
$148,000 Diaspora support from Europe
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The GSPC was structured into zones as depicted in Figure 2.  Often, when talking 
about operations within a certain zone in Algeria, the GSPC numbers are still used.  
However, it is believed that AQIM has restructured into regional zones: Central – 
Algeria, East – Tunisia, West – Mauritania, and South – The Sahel (Botha, June 2008, p. 
50).   
An emir heads each zone, which is further subdivided into katibats, or 
companies, with each katibat subdivided into three or four fassilas. A fassila in turn is 
made up of two sarayas, each with 12–18 members, often working in smaller groups of 
between two and six members (Botha, June 2008, p. 46).   
 
This hierarchical structure is reminiscent of a military organization which allows for good 
command and control as well as a potential for individuals or small groups to act 
independently with occasional guidance from higher.  The central, Algerian, zone has 
been less active in recent years due to increased pressure, including many high profile 
arrests, from Algerian forces.  The southern and western zones have become areas 
AQIM has been able to expand operations in recent years.   
2.2.2 AQIM Leadership. 
Abdelmalik Dourkdal (a.k.a. Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud) has been the leader of 
GSPC/AQIM since 2004.  Dourkdal was born in the Blida region of Algeria in 1970.  In 
1989, he earned his bachelor’s degree in Mathematics.  From 1990-1993, he studied 
chemistry and electrical engineering at the University of Blida.  In 1993, Dourkdal joined 
the GIA, working with explosives.  By 1996 he was placed in charge of training courses 
for the al-Ahwaal Brigade in the second zone.  Later he commanded the Al-Quds 
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Brigade.  In 2001, Dourkdal joined the GSPC and served in the second zone (Kohlmann, 
2007, p. 15).  After taking command of the GSPC in 2004, Dourkdal has expanded the 
area of operations of the GSPC/AQIM outside of Algeria and evolved their tactics to 
include suicide bombings and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).   
Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas; Khaled Abu Abbes; Laaouar or 
Belaouer (‘One Eyed’); Mr. Marlboro) has been a key leader of AQIM since its inception, 
operating in Southern Algeria and Northern Mali, and commanding of the El 
Moulethemine battalion.  He was born in 1972 in central Ghardaia, Algeria.  According 
to an interview, he claims he went to Afghanistan at the age of 19 to train and then 
fight.  While there he met a number of prominent jihadists from around the world and is 
believed to still maintain contact with Al-Qa’ida central.  He returned to Algeria in 1992 
and served in the southern zone of the GIA, GSPC and AQIM (Black, 2009).  Belmokhtar 
operates in northern Mali and is well known for kidnappings and trafficking of weapons 
and materials throughout the Sahara and Sahel regions.  He has four wives from the 
local Tuareg and Arab communities that help to provide him with connections (Black, 
2009).  Belmokhtar is thought to have connections within the Mali government and 
military as well.  He reportedly has had a falling out with the AQIM leader, Dourkdal, but 
still maintains connections and influence within AQIM providing them with money, 
weapons and materials.  In December 2012, Belmokhtar split from AQIM in order to 
form his own organization “Mouakaoun Bidima” the “Signatories by Blood.” (Jamestown 
Foundation, 2012)  This organization has been closely allied with another AQIM 
offshoot, MUJAO, and described in more detail in Section 4.3.   
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2.2.3 Regional Dynamics. 
The Maghreb countries consist of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania 
and the disputed territory of Western Sahara3.  Generally there are bands of eco-regions 
across the continent as a Mediterranean climate in the far north yields into the Saharan 
desert in the south.  The Sahara is the largest desert in the world stretching across North 
Africa comprising most of Western Sahara, Mauritania, Northern Mali, Algeria, Niger, 
Libya, Northern Chad, Northern Sudan, Egypt and Eritrea.  South of the Sahara running 
at 10 to 15 degrees North Latitude, is the Sahel.  The Sahel has the Sahara located to the 
north and the less arid savannah on its south.   
North Africa has been a melting pot of cultures dating back to before the time of 
Christ when Carthage was established by the Phoenicians.  Many different kingdoms 
have ruled the region including the Berber kingdom of Numidia, the Roman Empire, the 
Germanic Vandal Kingdom, the Byzantine Empire, the Islamic Caliphates and Emirates, 
the Ottoman Empire and, most recently, colonial France, Spain and Italy.  The Sahara 
has historically been mostly unpopulated, serving as a physical barrier between the 
population centers in the Northern Maghreb countries and the population centers south 
                                                     
3 Western Sahara is an unstable country in West Africa on the coast between Mauritania and Morocco.  
Morocco has annexed or laid claim to the entire country, but the Polisario Front has actively resisted 
annexation.  A civil war between Morocco and the Polisario Front ended in a UN brokered ceasefire in 
1991.  The Polisario Front was formed to represent the people of Western Sahara when the Spanish 
relinquished control of the colony.  The Polisario Front is backed by Algeria and is based in Tindouf, 
Algeria.  The Polisario Front is a group focused on the freedom of Western Sahara and does not have 
known Islamic extremist goals.  Although there is fear that the Polisario camps have become a recruiting 
ground for AQIM and other extremists (Alexander, 2012). 
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of the Sahel.  Nomadic people have traditionally operated trade routes through the 
desert to link the otherwise distant populations. 
  
Figure 3: Map of Africa showing the Sahara desert and the Sahel (World Atlas, 2013) 
The Maghrebian people are mostly Arab and Berber with some European and 
many different Sub-Saharan cultures.  The entire region is predominantly Muslim.  Niger 
has the largest non-Muslim population in the region (20%), followed by Mali (10%) (CIA 
World Factbook, 2012).   Mauritania is classified as having a mixed Moor and black 
population.  Mali and Niger are made up of a wide variety of ethnic groups.  With the 
exception of Tunisia (who’s population is classified solely as Arab), the population in 
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North Africa is almost completely classified as Arab-Berber.  Arab-Berber’s are mostly 
Berber in origin, but most identify themselves as being Arab.  Berber is a name for a 
wide variety of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes in North Africa.  Historically the Berber 
people spoke the Berber language, although now many speak Arabic and sometimes 
French as well.  Some of the most populous Berber groups are the Kabyles in Northern 
Algeria, the Shawia (also spelled Chaouia) of Northeastern Algeria, the Haratin, Rif, 
Berabers, and Ishelhiyen (Shluh) in Morocco, and the Tuareg in the Sahara 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013).   The Tuareg are a large group of pastoralist people in 
North Africa, located mostly in Algeria, Mali and Niger, as shown in Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4: Mainly Tuareg Area of North West Africa (Melly, 2012) 
The economies of the countries in which AQIM has influence can be divided into 
two separate categories, poor countries in the Sahara and North African hydrocarbon 
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and market oriented economies.  The poor Saharan countries are Mali, Mauritania and 
Niger.  Mauritania is the only country out of the three that is not landlocked.  All of 
these countries heavily depend on international money in order to function.  All of the 
countries are believed to have sizeable reserves of minerals: iron ore in Mauritania, gold 
in Mali and uranium in Niger.  Despite the mineral wealth, given the subsistent nature of 
the majority of their populations and the risk to foreign investment, these countries will 
likely continue to be poor for the foreseeable future.  The North African countries can 
be split into two groups: oil countries and market oriented countries.  The economies of 
Libya and Algeria depend heavily on oil and natural gas.  Whereas Tunisia and Morocco 
have developed market oriented economies with agriculture, mining, tourism, and 
manufacturing as contributing factors (CIA World Factbook, 2012).  With the recent 
turmoil in Libya and Tunisia, their economies have slowed and less reliable statistics are 
available.  High levels of unemployment throughout the region are often cited by 
experts as a contributing factor to disgruntled young men’s recruitment by extremist 
groups.  Table 2 outlines the GDP, GDP growth rates, unemployment rates, literacy, 
average age, and life expectancy of each of the countries where AQIM has influence.   
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Table 2: Significant Economic Figures for countries where AQIM has influence (CIA 
World Factbook, 2012) 
 
2.2.4 AQIM Affiliates and Off-Shoots. 
The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), Ansar Al-Din, The 
Movement for the Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Garbi 
Ifriqiya) (MUJAO), Signatories for Blood Battalion, and Boko Haram are militant groups 
affiliated (to various extents) with AQIM.  All of these militant organizations are 
introduced in this section.  MNLA, Ansar Al-Din, and MUJAO are discussed in more detail 
in Section 4.3. 
2.2.4.1 National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). 
The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) is a largely secular 
group whose goal is to liberate and establish a separate government in the area they 
Country GDP 
(2011)
Rank in 
World
GDP Growth 
Rate (2011)
Unemployment 
Rate (2011)
Literacy Average 
Age
Life 
Expectancy
Algeria
$267 
Billion
49 2.50% 10% 69.90% 28.1 74.73
Libya
$37.97 
Billion
101
2.5%          
(2010 est)
30% 89.20% 24.8 77.83
Mali
$18.1 
Billion
134 2.70% 30% (2004 est) 31.10% 16.4 53.06
Mauritania
$7.184 
Billion
155 3.60% 30% (2008 est) 58% 19.6 61.53
Morocco
$164.7 
Billion
59 4.30% 8.90% 56.10% 27.3 76.11
Niger
$11.78 
Billion
149 2.30% N/A 28.70% 15.2 53.8
Tunisia
$102.3 
Billion
71 -0.80% 18% 74.30% 30.5 75.24
Western 
Sahara
$906.5 
Million
203    
(2007)
N/A N/A N/A 20.5 61.52
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refer to as Azawad.  Azawad is the desert region in Northern Mali.  The movement is 
largely made up of ethnic Tuareg fighters.  The MNLA fighters consist of people who 
participated in the last two rebellions (1990’s and 2006), people who fought on both 
sides of the recent Libya war, volunteers from other ethnicities in the region, and 
defected soldiers from the Malian army (Attaher, 2012).  The MNLA, with Islamist 
extremist help, began its most recent rebellion in early 2012.  The Malian military, after 
initial attempts to stifle the rebellion, was overwhelmed by the firepower, organization, 
and effectiveness of the rebel fighters.  On 22 March, the Malian army overthrew the 
government, in part because of the lack of support provided to the military to fight the 
rebellion.  Sidetracked by the coup, poorly equipped, and facing a well armed and 
formidable opponent, the Malian military lost control of all of Northern Mali to the 
MNLA.   In April 2012, the MNLA issued a declaration of independence for Azawad.  
Disagreements between the MNLA and the more extreme Islamic groups that assisted 
the rebellion resulted in conflict between the rebels.  By the end of June, the MNLA lost 
control of much of Northern Mali to the extreme Islamic groups of AQIM, Ansar Al-Din, 
and MUJAO (BBC News, 2012).  See the map in Figure 5 for the portion of Mali lost to 
the MNLA and other groups. 
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Figure 5: Map depicting the territory in Northern Mali (Azawad) controlled by the 
MNLA and then Islamist groups.  (The Economist, 2012) 
2.2.4.2 Ansar Al-Din (AAD). 
The Ansar Al-Din (“Supporters of Religion” or “Defenders of Faith”) is a new 
organization inside Mali established in 2012 by Iyad Ag Ghaly, one of the leaders in the 
Tuareg rebellion in the 1990’s.  There are strong indications that Ansar Al-Din is 
associated with AQIM based on their common goal of establishing an Islamic state and 
the connections of Ag Ghaly with one of AQIM’s leaders, Hamada Ag Hama.  The Ansar 
Al-Din fought alongside the MNLA in Northern Mali, but after taking control of Azawad, 
the differences between MNLA and Ansar Al-Din became too great.  In the Battle of Gao, 
on 27 June 2012, Ansar Al-Din and MUJAO defeated the MNLA and took control of the 
main cities in Northern Mali(BBC News, 2012). Ansar Al-Din and MNLA are both led by 
individuals from the Ifoghas Tuareg tribe, making them close despite the conflict.   Ansar 
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Al-Din’s goals differ from the MNLA in that they want Mali to remain united and for 
Shari’a law to govern the whole country (BBC News, 2012).  Ansar Al-Din has operated 
primarily in the Timbuktu and Kidal regions of Northern Mali and has been imposing the 
harshest version of Shari’a law (Reuters, 2012).   
2.2.4.3 Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). 
The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi 
Garbi Ifriqiya) (MUJAO) is an AQIM off-shoot in West Africa.  The organization is led by 
Mauritanian national Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (a.k.a. Abou QumQum) and is 
seen by many as a way to expand the mission of AQIM.  Other analysts see the creation 
of MUJAO as evidence of AQIM splintering due to the native Algerian leadership’s 
unwillingness to allow non-Algerians to rise through the ranks (Idoumou, 2011).   
MUJAO has made several major headlines since their inception.  The first was in 
reference to three hostages taken from a refugee camp in southern Algeria in October 
2011.  The three were released on 20 July 2012 in a prisoner exchange and a reported 
ransom of $18.4 million (The Associated Press, 2012).  This shows that the MUJAO has 
adopted tactics similar to the AQIM to finance their operations.  The second headline 
was a suicide attack that MUJAO claimed responsibility for in Ouargla, Algeria.  It took 
place on 30 June 2012 against the Algerian national gendarmerie headquarters in which 
a man drove a Toyota 4x4 packed with 1,300 kg of explosives into a police facility.  The 
attack killed one and injured three policemen (Magharebia, 2012).  MUJAO’s 
participation with Ansar Al-Din in defeating the MNLA in northern Mali has caused many 
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to wonder what connections exist between MUJAO, Ansar Dine and AQIM or if they are 
different parts of the same organization.  MUJAO has been operating primarily in the 
Gao region of Mali and have enforced Shari’a Law within the cities under their control 
(Reuters, 2012). 
2.2.4.4 The Signatories for Blood Battalion. 
The Signatories for Blood Battalion, led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, is a recent 
addition to the extreme Islamic groups operating in the region.  They officially split from 
AQIM in December 2012.  As previously discussed, Belmokhtar has been a longstanding 
AQIM emir operating in the porous Saharan desert from Southern Algeria and Northern 
Mali east to Southern Libya.  Due to his experiences and connections from working in 
the region, Belmokhtar’s organization has instant credibility.  The Signatories for Blood 
Battalion is closely aligned with another AQIM offshoot, MUJAO.   Their first high profile 
operation was an attack on the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria resulting in nearly 800 
initial hostages in which at least 37 hostages and 29 militants died (Jegarajah, 2013).   
2.2.4.5 Boko Haram. 
Boko Haram is an Islamist terrorist organization located in northern Nigeria.  The 
goal of Boko Haram is to overthrow the Nigerian government and establish a pure 
Islamic state.  Boko Haram has had several high profile attacks including bombing a UN 
compound in Abuja, numerous police stations and churches and most recently setting 
schools on fire.  They have publicly declared war on Christians within the country and 
have caused many to move to the southern part of the country.  Boko Haram is a local 
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terrorist group and focuses almost exclusively on Nigeria (Walker, 2012).  None of their 
rhetoric has been in concert with Al-Qa’ida’s global jihad.  However, there has been 
evidence of communication and cooperation between Boko Haram and AQIM.  Just 
recently, General Ham, the commander of AFRICOM said, "Most notably I would say 
that the linkages between AQIM and Boko Haram are probably the most worrisome in 
terms of the indications we have that they are likely sharing funds, training, and 
explosive materials that can be quite dangerous (Doyle, 2012)."  Boko Haram’s leader 
and Nigeria’s president have made claims that Boko Haram is linked to AQIM.  However, 
since Boko Haram may be trying to increase its popularity on the world stage and 
Nigeria is trying to get foreign funding, it is difficult to know the truth.  What is known is 
that Boko Haram is capable of executing terrorist acts and is a serious threat to the 
stability of Nigeria.  If the group decides to expand their area of operations and begins 
to work closer with other African jihadist groups like AQIM or Al-Shabab, then the 
situation could grow even worse. 
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2.2.5 Historical Context of Mali Conflict. 
 French influence in Africa cannot be overstated as they have had African 
possessions since the 17th century.  Although much of West Africa gained independence 
from France around 1960, France continues to have influence in the area.  Many of the 
countries still use French as their official language (see Figure 6) and others, being 
former French colonies, still have many French speakers.   
  
Figure 6: Official Languages in Africa (Africa, 2008) on left and Map of European 
colonies in Africa in 1914 (Exploring Africa, 2013) on right 
 Mali was a French colony prior to 1960 when it officially gained independence.  
Following independence, a dictatorship controlled the country.  President Alpha Konare 
won the first two democratic presidential elections in 1992 and 1997.  President 
Amadou Toumani Touré won the next two elections in 2002 and 2007 (CIA World 
Factbook, 2012).  Given this history, it was generally considered to be a stable 
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democracy and a model to emulate for other African countries.  However, dating back 
to its colonial days, Mali has had ethnic tension and conflict in its Northern provinces 
particularly due to Tuareg unrest (Lecocq, 2010).   
 The Tuareg historically have had a society based on a set of social strata into 
which one is born, including a lower slave class (Lecocq, 2010, p. 5).  Baz Lecocq, in his 
book, Disputed Desert, classifies a Tuareg’s status by considering if one is free or unfree, 
part of a strong or weak group, and if they have a prestigious lineage or not.  While not 
always accurate, the slave class was traditionally perceived as ‘black’ and the noble class 
as ‘white’.  Even though France formally abolished slavery in 1905, the emancipation 
process is still not complete in some Tuareg societies (Lecocq, 2005).  The legacy of 
slavery has fueled ethnic divisions in Northern Mali throughout history and continues to 
plague the relations between the ‘white’ Tuareg and the ‘black’ ethnic groups of other 
parts of Mali.   
 In 1960 when the Tuareg people of Mali were told by the French that their land 
would be controlled by the government in Bamako, there was immediate resistance.  
The first of three Tuareg rebellions was in response to being included in the state of Mali 
and happened between May 1963 and August 1964.  This conflict, eventually won by 
the Malian government, resulted in many civilian Tuareg killings by government troops.  
The Tuareg, whose main leaders were arrested, eventually were persuaded to stop 
fighting, leading to a relative calm for many years (Lecocq, 2010).  
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 The next major rebellion from 1990-1996 resulted in a time when Mali 
nationalism was at a high point, as democracy was taking shape in the country.  The 
Tuareg were portrayed by the Mali government as nomad invaders and ethnic 
differences were highlighted and exploited.  The Tuareg, fighting in the desert terrain, as 
they are accustomed, were militarily superior to the government troops leading to a 
compromised peace called the National Pact.  This peace incorporated Tuareg into the 
military, a decreased presence of the Malian military in the north, provided tax 
exemptions to Northern inhabitants for ten years, and a special social economic and 
administrative status for the North (Lecocq, 2010, pp. 322-323).  However, many of 
these agreements were slow to be implemented or were not implemented at all, 
leading to further discontent.   
 In May 2006, a Tuareg group called the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC) 
rebelled against the Malian government calling for adherence to the National Pact, 
more autonomy for Northern Mali, and a more equitable distribution of resources 
(Miller, 2013).  Iyad Ag Ghaly, the future leader of AAD, and Ibrahim Ag Bahanga were 
two of the major figures of this movement.  Ag Ghaly and most of the Tuareg would 
agree to an Algerian mediated ceasefire while Ag Bahanga and a small group would 
continue to fight, eventually being exiled to Libya.  In 2011 Ag Bahanga died in a car 
accident.  His organization would eventually join the MNLA in their quest for an 
independent Azawad. 
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 The most recent Tuareg rebellion, beginning in January 2012, initially resulted in 
large territorial gains by the Tuareg.  Organized under the National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Tuareg took control of all of Northern Mali.  The 
conditions for this rebellion were set up on a number of key factors.  Previous 
agreements between the Tuareg and the Mali government were perceived by the 
Tuareg as broken promises.  Additionally, following the fall of the Libyan dictator, 
Gaddafi, many Tuareg fighters who were employed by the Libyan military returned to 
Mali with large amounts of weapons.  To add to the mixture, AQIM and other Islamic 
extremist groups that had been operating in the region for years were willing to assist 
the MNLA in armed resistance against the government.  These organizations added 
money, weapons and fighters to an already powerful group.  The Malian army, 
attempting to fight the rebellion, was poorly trained and equipped, and forced to deal 
with desertions of Tuareg and others to the opposing side.  Feeling unsupported by the 
government, the Mali army Captain Amadou Sanogo organized a coup to depose 
President Touré.  Following the coup, the government forces put up little resistance, 
allowing the MNLA, with assistance from extremist Islamic fighters, to gain control over 
large portions of Northern Mali.  In April 2012, the MNLA issued a declaration of 
independence for Azawad.  Shortly after independence, two Islamic extremist groups, 
Ansar Al-Din and MUJAO, began enforcing a strict interpretation of Shari’a law in areas 
they controlled.  The MNLA, in favor of a more tolerant form of Islamic government, 
objected to imposing Shari’a law on the population.  This led to disagreements between 
the MNLA and the Islamic extremist organizations.  Battles began to take place 
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throughout Northern Mali with MNLA losing control of much of the territory to Ansar Al-
Din and MUJAO (BBC News, 2012).     
 In early January 2013, Islamic extremist fighters began pushing further south into 
government held territory.  The provisional Malian government, unable to stop the 
militants themselves, asked France for support.  The French entered Mali on 11 January 
2013.  By early February all of the main cities of Northern Mali were regained by Malian, 
French and other forces.  Other than France, the international ground forces are from 
African nations supported by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the operation is classified by the United Nations as the African-led 
International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).  By the end of January 2013, 1,400 non-
French AFISMA troops were supporting the mission in Mali from Nigeria, Benin, Togo, 
Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad (Nuland, 2013). 
2.2.6 United States Efforts in the Region. 
 The Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is the U.S. 
government’s program designed to provide support and training to governments in the 
Pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal) 
(Africom.mil, 2012).  Additionally, TSCTP is designed to increase communication and 
counterterrorism efforts between the Pan-Sahel countries and Maghreb countries 
(Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia).  The U.S. seeks to increase multinational support for 
counterterrorism principals within Africa by engaging the African Union and the 
Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS).  TSCTP replaced the smaller 
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scope of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) that took place from 2002 to 2005.  TSCTP is a 
multifaceted approach led by the State Department that includes the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), Department of the Treasury, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense (DoD).  The DoD portion of TSCTP is 
called Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara (OEF-TS).  OEF-TS focuses more on 
security and cooperation than on counterterrorism.  In 2007, AFRICOM was established 
and has since assumed responsibility of the military portion of the TSCTP.   
 Bilateral support from the U.S. government is also given to countries within the 
Maghreb and Sahel region in the form of the Anti Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program.  
In 2009, the U.S. spent over $500,000 to train Moroccan and Libyan police (CSIS, 2010, 
p. 6).  “The Defense Department is also using ‘1206 funding’ authorized in the 2006 
National Defense Authorization Act by providing military equipment and hardware 
(CSIS, 2010, p. 6).”  Additionally, the U.S. is participating in the NATO OPERATION 
ACTIVE ENDEAVER which is a naval operation designed to prevent smuggling between 
Africa and Europe.   
 The United States must prioritize its potential actions against AQIM in context 
with all other actions around the world.  The actions of the United States within the 
Maghreb are just a small part of the actions conducted within Africa.  There are terrorist 
threats all across Africa from the Maghreb to Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Somalia, and Yemen (Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula - AQAP).  See Figure 7 for a map 
provided by the Washington Post on 13 June 2012 depicting their estimation of U.S. 
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military intelligence operations ongoing within Africa and the Arabian Peninsula 
(Whitlock, 2012). 
 
Figure 7: U.S. Military Intelligence Network within Africa (Whitlock, 2012) 
 The United States has supported and assisted in the French operations in Mali 
through “refueling efforts, logistical movements, troop transport and information 
sharing (Roulo, 2013).”  From 21 January to 29 January 2013, the U.S. Air Force provided 
airlift support primarily through C-17 Globemaster III sorties.  Additionally, the U.S. KC-
135 Stratotanker supported French fighter aircraft with refueling missions (Roulo, 2013).  
The United States has agreed to future airlift missions including providing support to 
troops from African countries that have volunteered to assist in Mali.  In addition, the 
U.S. signed a status of forces agreement with Niger in January 2013 (Nuland, 2013) to 
provide an opportunity for increased intelligence collection opportunities in the region.  
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2.3 Dark Social Networks 
 Given the historical background of AQIM and the conflict in Mali, as well as the 
United States’ interests in eliminating the ability of terrorists to operate openly, there is 
an obvious need to gain a better understanding of the key actors participating in this 
conflict. Social network analysis methods can be used to analyze the key actor’s 
relationships and make observations about the conflict as a whole.  In recent years, 
social network analysis has become a popular and valuable tool for modeling and 
understanding networks of all kinds.  Dark networks are illegal and covert networks such 
as terrorists, drug traffickers, and insurgencies (Raab & Milward, 2003).  Since 
September 11, 2001, due to the War on Terror and increased grant money, researchers 
have gained an increased focus publishing many articles on social network analysis of 
terrorist organizations.  Ressler (2006) outlines social network analysis contributions to 
dark networks.  Krebs (2001) mapped the 9-11 terrorist network, Rodriguez (2005) 
modeled the 2004 Madrid train bombings, Sageman’s book, Understanding  Terror 
Networks, (2004) collected biographies on 172 Islamic terrorists from open sources to 
study terrorist networks around the world.  Carley has multiple works: Dynamic 
Network Analysis (2003), Estimating Vulnerabilities in Large Covert Networks (2004), 
Destabilization of Covert Networks (2006), and Locating Optimal Destabilization 
Strategies (Moon & Carley, 2007) just to name a few.  Walther and Christopoulos (2012) 
authored an excellent SNA of individuals involved in the current Mali rebellion based on 
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names gathered in French newspapers.  No other previous work has been found by the 
author that has attempted to analyze signed dark social networks.   
2.4 Graph Theory and Social Network Analysis 
Graph theory provides social network analysts the vocabulary, mathematical 
operations and theorems to model networks (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 93).  Graphs 
have been widely used in SNA to represent social relations since Moreno (1934) 
published graphical depictions of social networks in his seminal work: Who Shall 
Survive? Foundations of Sociometry, Group Psychotherapy and Sociodrama.  A graph, G 
= (N, E), is made up of a set nodes, N, representing n actors within a network, and a set 
of edges, E, representing m ties or relationships between two actors (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994, p. 72).    There are n nodes and m arcs within a graph.  In Figure 8, G = (N, E) 
where N = {A, B, C, D} and E equals the relationships {a, b, c, d, e} or {A-C, A-B, A-D, B-D, 
C-D}.  In this case n = 4 and m = 5. 
              
Figure 8: A notional network with solid lines representing positive relationships and 
dotted lines representing negative relationships.   
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996) 
Actors or graphical nodes are the basis for SNA.  An actor can be an individual or 
a group of individuals that may or may not have ties to another actor (individual or 
a
c
b d
e
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group).  Actors that have ties or relations to other actors are shown graphically by 
drawing a line between the two nodes. Relations can be either directed or undirected.  
More simple social networks consist of undirected ties, meaning that the relationship 
between the two actors is given and received by both actors.  This type of relationship is 
symmetric (i,j) = (j,i).  The network in Figure 8 has undirected ties making it symmetric.  
In a directed relationship, one actor influences the other actor, but the relationship may 
or may not be reciprocated.  This type of relationship is graphically depicted with an 
arrow instead of just a line.  Directed relationships are shown visually in a directional 
graph or digraph.  Within a digraph arrows point towards the actor that is receiving 
influence.   
A walk is “a sequence of nodes and lines, starting and ending with nodes, in 
which each node is incident with the lines following and preceding it in the sequence” 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 105).  The length of a walk is the sum of the lengths of all 
of the arcs of the walk.  A walk from node A to node D is A-C-D with a length of two or A-
D with a length of one, assuming each arc is a length of one.  A cycle is a walk of at least 
three nodes that begins and ends at the same node, all lines are unique, and all nodes 
(other than the start/end node) are unique (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 108).  The 
cycles in Figure 8 are A-B-D-A, A-C-D-A, and A-C-D-B-A.    
Social networks are mathematically depicted by using matrices.  If actor i is 
influencing actor j, then the (i, j) cell of the matrix will have a value representing the 
strength of that influence.  If actor i has no relationship with actor j, then cell (i, j) will 
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have the value of zero.  In an n by n matrix, called an adjacency matrix, each cell (1, 1) to 
(n, n) is populated with a value representing the relationship between i and j.  Each of 
the values on the diagonal (1, 1) to (n, n) are zero because only external relationships 
are considered.  The adjacency matrix is used to calculate measures and draw 
conclusions on the significance of different actors within the network based on their 
connections.  The signed adjacency matrix, an adjacency matrix that has signed values, 
is symmetric when non-directional relationships exist within a network.  When 
directional relationships exist, the matrix becomes asymmetric.  When actor i has a 
relationship with actor j, but actor j does not have a relationship with actor i, then there 
is a value in cell (i, j) of the signed adjacency matrix and a 0 in cell (j, i).  This type of 
relationship may exist when actors are in different spheres of influence (such as a leader 
and follower, where the leader does not know the follower well, but the follower is 
influenced by the leader). 
 
Figure 9: A matrix representation of the graph in Figure 8 
In a signed matrix, where a relationship can be positive, negative or null, a value 
of one in cell (i, j) depicts a positive relationship from i to j, a negative one represents a 
negative relationship from i to j and a zero shows no relationship exists.  Figure 9 
displays the matrix form of the network from Figure 8.   
A B C D
A 1 -1 -1
B 1 1
C -1 -1
D -1 1 -1
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Most algorithms and other sources of Social Network Analysis are designed for 
binary data.  Other scales of measurement that exist are Multiple Category Nominal, 
Grouped Ordinal, Full Rank Ordinal and Interval.  The Multiple Category Nominal 
measurement is used when different types of relations are measured.  In this case if no 
relation exists then a zero would still be used, but a one, two or other number could 
represent other relations.  These numbers represent categories not numerical values, 
therefore category two is not necessarily twice as important as category one.  Multiple 
Category Nominal data can be converted into binary data for each type of relationship 
or to depict if a relationship exists or does not exist.   
Grouped Ordinal data uses the binary numbers, but also allows for a -1 value if a 
negative relationship exists.  Full Rank Ordinal measurement ranks the actors from 1 to 
n.  This scale indicates that one is more important than two and two is more important 
than three, but not necessarily at the same proportion.  The Interval scale is similar to 
the Full Rank Ordinal Scale except that the interval scale maintains the strength of tie 
(Hanneman, 2005).   
As previously stated, binary data is most commonly used and widely applied type 
of data in SNA. SNA metrics are most often defined for use with binary data.  However, 
when more data is available, analysts can use this data for increased understanding of 
the intricacies of the network.  Table 3 shows the different scales of measurement that 
are used to mathematically represent data.  Chapter One of Hanneman’s book 
Introduction to Social Network Methods outlines different scales of measurement often 
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used in social networks. In order to evaluate signed networks, Grouped Ordinal data are 
primarily used in this thesis.  Whatever scale is used, however, it is assumed that a valid 
method to develop such data has been utilized.  Care must be taken to assure this 
assumption is valid. 
Table 3: Scales of Measurement (Hanneman, 2005) 
Binary 0 = No Relationship; 1 = Relationship 
Multiple Category 
Nominal 
0 = No Relationship; 1,2,3, etc = different types of relationships 
Grouped Ordinal 0 = No Relationship; 1 = Positive Relationship; -1 = Negative 
Relationship 
Full Rank Ordinal Actors ranked in order from 1 to n (where n = # of actors); 1 is 
more important than 2, but no strength of tie can be inferred 
Interval Actors ranked in order and scaled according to the strength of 
the tie (1 is 2 times as important as 2) 
2.5 Structural Balance Theory 
Fritz Heider, an Austrian psychologist, first developed the idea of balance theory 
in Attitudes and Cognitive Organization (1946).  Heider’s cognitive balance theory 
observes how positive and negative relationships coexist within social situations.  
Examples of positive relationships are: friends, like, love, or trust.  A negative 
relationship is the opposite of the positive (i.e. enemies, dislike, hate, or distrust).  
Heider evaluates the relationships between two actors and three actors and defines 
balance.  Heider’s theory is best described by quoting his paper: 
In the case of two entities, a balanced state exists if the relation 
between them is positive (or negative) in all respects….  In the case of 
three entities, a balanced state exists if all three relations are positive in 
all respects, or if two are negative and one positive.(1946, p. 110) 
           
2-34 
 
When observing a relationship between two actors (a dyad), there is balance 
only when both parties like or dislike each other.  Tension is observed in a relationship 
where one party likes the other, but is disliked by the other.  According to Heider, this 
creates an unbalanced relationship and is calculated by multiplying the signs of the 
relationship.  Two positive relationships (+)·(+)=(+) and two negative relationships          
(-)·(-)=(+) both result in a balanced (positive) relationship.  Whereas a (+)·(-) or (-)·(+) 
both result in an unbalanced (negative) relationship.   
When observing three actors (a triple or triad), eight different possibilities exist 
in an undirected network (the relationship of i to j equals the relationship of j to i).  The 
eight possibilities are presented in Figure 10.  Heider referred to the three parts of a 
triple as P for the person, O for other and X for another entity or object.  Throughout 
this thesis, i, j and k are used as the three nodes of the triad; all of them represent 
individuals (or groups of individuals).  For simplicity, throughout the thesis the term like 
(dislike) is used to describe a positive (negative) relationship. 
 
Figure 10: The eight possible triples that can exist in an undirected network.  Adopted 
from (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 224) 
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The top row of Figure 10 consists of balanced triples.  A triple is balanced if the 
product of the cycle (a sequence of nodes and lines that are each distinct except for 
having the same starting and ending node) in each triple is positive.  A triple with three 
positives or one positive and two negatives is balanced.  If a triple has all positive 
relationships, then there is balance because everyone likes each other resulting in 
minimal tension.  When there are two negative relations and a positive relation, there is 
balance because the two actors that like each other dislike the third actor and the third 
actor dislikes both other actors.  The bottom row of Figure 10 consists of unbalanced 
triples.  This is easily identified because the product of the cycle of the three 
relationships (two positives and a negative and three negatives) results in a negative 
value.  Heider’s presentation suggested an explanation on what would happen within an 
unbalanced triple: 
If no balanced state exists, then forces towards this state will 
arise.  Either the dynamic characters will change, or the unit relations will 
be changed through action or through cognitive reorganization. If a 
change is not possible, the state of imbalance will produce tension. 
(1946, pp. 107-108) 
 If one actor likes the other two, but they do not like each other, there is tension within 
the group.  It is likely that enough stress will be put on the relationships to cause one of 
them to change in either of two ways.  The negative relationship could turn positive 
resulting in three positive relationships and balance.  The other option is that the actor 
with two positive relations may have to choose which friend it likes better and team 
with that friend against the third.  This action would result in two negatives and a 
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positive, putting the triple into a balanced state.  In the case where all three actors 
dislike each other, instability occurs and over time it is likely that two actors will join 
against the third actor resulting in a balanced triple.  
Harary (1953) and Cartwright and Harary (1956) expanded the structural balance 
concept using graph theory to mathematically explain Heider’s concepts.  Cartwright 
and Harary (1956) enabled Heider’s concepts to be applied to units containing more 
than three entities.  Building on the concept of a triple being balanced if the product of 
the cycle is positive, Cartwright and Harary defined a signed graph as being balanced if 
all of its cycles are balanced.  The example in Figure 11, taken from Cartwright and 
Harary (1956), demonstrates how the seven cycles in graphs a and b are all positive, 
making those graphs balanced.  Graphs c and d are not balanced because they contain 
at least one cycle that is negative, for example the cycles h-j-k-h in graphs c and d are 
negative (as are other cycles). 
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Figure 11: Four signed graphs containing four points and six lines each.  Structures a 
and b are balanced but c and d are not balanced (Cartwright & Harary, 1956, p. 284). 
Dashed lines represent negative relations and solid lines represent positive relations. 
Balance theory is widely applicable to many areas of social science.  It has been 
applied to international relations (Harary, 1961)(Moore, 1978), consumer behavior 
(Woodside, 2001), (Russell & Stern, 2006), (Roy, Gammoh, & Koh, 2012), and supply 
chain and logistics (Carson, Carson, Knouse, & Roe, 1997) to cite a few.  As more signed 
social network data has become available in recent years, analysis has been conducted 
using large signed data sets from Epinions, Slashdot Zoo, Wikipedia and other websites 
to evaluate and predict signed relations.  Guha et al. (2004) were the first to develop an 
approval of balance theory to evaluate a person’s trust/distrust relationships and 
predict whether he will trust/distrust others in the network.  This propagation of trust 
creates a wider trust network through the notion that the friend of my friend is also my 
friend, the friend of my enemy is my enemy, the enemy of my friend is my enemy, and 
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the enemy of my enemy is my friend.  The literature review in Section 2.8 provides a 
detailed list of sources where balance theory is used to evaluate signed network data. 
2.6 Subsets within a Signed Network 
2.6.1 Two Subsets in a Balanced Signed Graph. 
If all cycles within the graph need to be identified and calculated to determine 
structural balance, then large graphs can quickly become computationally challenging 
problems.  For this reason, it may be easier to determine if a graph is balanced through 
other methods.  Cartwright and Harary also defined a signed graph as being balanced “if 
and only if all paths joining the same pair of points have the same sign” and “if its points 
can be separated into two mutually exclusive subsets such that each positive line joins 
two points of the same subset and each negative line joins points from different subsets 
(Cartwright & Harary, 1956, p. 286).”  Using this method, a balanced graph can be 
partitioned into two subsets allowing for an easier determination if the graph is 
balanced or not.  See Figure 11b for an example of a balanced graph that is divided into 
two mutually exclusive subsets (i,j,k is one and h is the other).  It should be noted that 
sometimes one of the subsets of a balanced graph is empty, as is the case of the graph 
in Figure 11a.  Additionally, a visual inspection of a balanced graph may not be as 
obviously balanced as the example in Figure 11b. 
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2.6.2 Identifying More than Two Subsets of a Signed Graph. 
Davis (1967) built on Cartwright and Harary’s observations that a balanced graph 
can be split into two subsets after observing that in reality signed graphs could often be 
split into more than two subsets.  Davis defined a clustering as two or more subsets of a 
signed graph.  He then proved that for any signed graph S, “S has a clustering if and only 
if S contains no cycle having exactly one negative line (Davis, 1967, p. 181).”  
Additionally, “two points are in the same subset if and only if they are joined by an all-
positive path (Davis, 1967, p. 182).”  For example in Figure 11 graphs a, b and d, there 
are no cycles with exactly one negative line.  Therefore, these graphs are balanced and 
can be divided into subsets.  To determine the subsets, search for positive paths 
between points.  The only positive path in graph b is i-j-k-i therefore i, j, and k are in one 
subset and h is in another.  Graphs a and d are both examples where one of the subsets 
are empty.  Graph c cannot be divided into subsets because it has at least one cycle with 
one negative line (i-h-j-i or k-h-j-k).  If a graph, when divided into k subsets, is balanced, 
then it is said to be k-balanced or a weakly balanced network.  Graph d is 3-balanced 
because i and h are in one subset and j and k are each in their own subset.  Nodes i and 
h are determined to be in the same subset because they have a positive connection. 
Unfortunately, when working with real data, networks are rarely perfectly 
balanced and therefore are unable to be neatly divided into subsets.  To account for 
this, other methods for clustering groups of actors into subsets with similar 
characteristics are required.  The general clustering problem is an optimization problem 
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to partition a graph C into sub units C = {C1, C2, …, Ck} where the minimum distance is 
found between clusters.  The farther the distance between two clusters, the bigger the 
difference between the groups.  Groups that have a small distance between them are 
more closely related than groups that are farther away.  Distance can be measured in 
many different ways, but common methods are variations of the Minkowski distance 
(the Manhattan, Euclidean, and Chebyshev) and Mahalanobis distance measures.  These 
methods use different mathematical techniques to calculate between the centers of 
clusters Ci and Cj.  There is a large amount of literature dedicated to the field of cluster 
analysis and there are many heuristics and algorithms used to partition data into like 
groups.  The two most common methods of clustering are partitioning and hierarchical.  
These methods are introduced in the following two sections.  A review of clustering 
techniques of weakly balanced networks in the literature is discussed in section 2.8. 
2.6.2.1 Partitioning Methods. 
A partitioning method constructs k clusters, or subsets, from the nodes.  The 
analyst may know that the nodes need to be divided into k number of subsets or 
multiple k can be found to find the most optimal solution.  Each subset must contain at 
least one actor and each actor can only belong to one subset (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 
1990, p. 38).  Due to these constraints, the number of subsets must be less than or 
equal to the number of actors, k ≤ n.  The difficulty with clustering via the partitioning 
method is that the number of partitions is equal to the second-order Stirling number 
shown in Equation 1 (Doreian, Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005, p. 135): 
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As n and k increase, the number of possible partitions becomes very large.  
Therefore, enumeration of all possible options where k is large (generally greater than 
12) becomes a computationally difficult problem.   
2.6.2.2 Hierarchical Methods. 
Hierarchical algorithms conduct a series of partitions in a graph from k=1 (all 
actors in one group) to k=n (all actors form their own groups).  The algorithm steps 
through the process by dividing the graph into two groups.  It next divides one of those 
two groups into another group, forming three groups.  The approach then takes one of 
the three groups and splits it.  It continues until all actors are completely partitioned 
from each other.  Some hierarchical algorithms work in the opposite sequence, starting 
with a completely segmented group and systematically grouping actors together.  This 
type of clustering does not allow for corrections to be made.  For example, no group can 
be split up if they are put together in a previous step, even if it would result in a better 
clustering.  This allows hierarchical methods to be computationally much quicker than 
partitioning methods, but can limit the accuracy of the clusters (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 
1990, p. 45). 
2.6.3 Blockmodeling. 
“Blockmodeling is best viewed as a set of general tools for clustering social actors and 
social relations in meaningful ways (Doreian, Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005, p. 131).” 
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Models that simplify and explain a complex network without losing important 
information are valuable.  A blockmodel provides this capability by presenting a network 
in a way that highlights the positions and roles of the actors within the network.  
Blockmodels were first developed by White, Boorman and Breiger (1976).  Blockmodels 
consist of a partition of actors in the network into discrete subsets (positions).  Each 
position has a unique relationship to each other position within the network 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 395).   
2.6.3.1 Blockmodeling Displays. 
A blockmodel can be displayed many ways; by a reduced graph, by a matrix, or 
by an image matrix (Doreian, Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005, p. 169).  A reduced graph 
combines each subset of actors into a node and redraws the graph using the condensed 
number of nodes.  This presents a less cluttered illustration of the dynamics between 
the different subsets within the network.  See Figure 12  for the reduced graph of Figure 
11b. 
 
Figure 12: Figure 11b on the left and its reduced graph on the right.  The reduced 
graph combines three nodes with the same relationships into one node, making the 
graph less complex.  Dashed lines represent negative relations and solid lines 
represent positive relations. 
i
k j
h
i,j,k h
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A matrix can be used to show a blockmodel by rearranging the signed adjacency 
matrix so that subsets of similar actors are grouped together along both axes of the 
matrix.  Once similar actors are grouped, lines dividing the subsets are drawn in both the 
horizontal and vertical directions.  This delineates the relationships of the subsets into 
blocks.  Each block represents how the two groups relate.  If there are all ones and zeros 
in a block (positive block), then the subgroups in that row/column have all positive (or 
null) relations.  If there are all negative ones and zeros in a block (negative block) then 
the subgroups in that row/column have all negative (or null) relations.  If there are all 
zeros in a block, then there is no relation between the subgroups in the rows/columns 
of that block.  A blockmodel of a balanced signed network consists of positive blocks on 
the diagonal blocks and negative blocks off the diagonal (Ferligoj, Doreian, & Batagelj, 
2011, p. 438).  
 
Figure 13: The matrix representing the network in Figure 12 is on the left and the 
image matrix on the same network is on the right.  The matrices have lines separating 
the blocks and displaying the two subsets within the network. 
An image matrix displays a blockmodel in a similar way that a matrix does.  The 
difference is that the image matrix does not use zeros, ones and negative ones.  The 
h -1 -1 -1
i -1 1 1
j -1 1 1
k -1 1 1
h i j k
h i j k
h -1 -1 -1
i -1 1 1
j -1 1 1
k -1 1 1
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image matrix uses colors (black for positive, red for negative, and white for zero is 
commonly used in grouped ordinal data) or images (often X’s, O’s and blank to 
represent ones, negative ones, and zeros respectively).  The image matrix allows for the 
analyst to visually detect where inconsistencies exist easier than in a normal matrix.   
2.6.3.2 Conventional Blockmodeling. 
Conventional blockmodeling partitions actors based on the structural or regular 
equivalence of the actors.  Two actors are structurally equivalent if they are connected 
exactly the same way to other actors in a network.  Regular equivalence is a more 
general form of structural equivalence grouping actors that are in the same hierarchy.  A 
formal definition for both can be found in Generalized Blockmodeling(Doreian, Batagelj, 
& Ferligoj, 2005, p. 172).  Structurally equivalent actors can be grouped together within 
the signed adjacency matrix.  The set of relations from actors in group Ci to all actors in 
Cj forms a block. Given k different clusters, the matrix can be sectioned into k2 blocks.  
There are k(k-1) off diagonal blocks which contain ties between blocks (Ferligoj, Doreian, 
& Batagelj, 2011).    Conventional blockmodeling converts network data into 
(dis)similarity matrices that are then clustered based on structural equivalence using 
one of the many clustering algorithms.  
2.6.3.3 Generalized Blockmodeling.  
Doreian et. al. (2005) developed generalized blockmodeling to work directly with 
the data (instead of transforming it), loosen the restrictions on conventional 
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blockmodeling allowing for more block types, and use a criterion function to measure 
the fit of the data (Doreian, Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005, pp. 25-26).  Since generalized 
blockmodeling works directly with the data, it does not have to compute (dis)similarity 
matrices which sometimes do not equate the data well in terms of structural 
equivalence.  Furthermore, in using a criterion function, generalized blockmodeling 
allows for a measure for how well the blockmodel fits the data.  This is beneficial in 
evaluating and comparing different blockmodels.  See Chapter Six of Generalized 
Blockmodeling (Doreian, Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005) for more information on the 
differences between conventional and generalized blockmodeling.    
2.6.3.4 Relaxed Blockmodeling. 
 Doreian and Mrvar (2009) outline a more wide-ranging approach to signed 
generalized blockmodeling through relaxed blockmodeling, allowing for both positive 
and negative blocks to appear anywhere on the blockmodel.  Generalized 
blockmodeling allows positive blocks only on the diagonal and negative blocks only off 
the diagonal.  The relaxed approach is based on the theory that there are other forces 
outside of structural balance theory that contribute to the clustering of actors within a 
network.  This approach still allows for structural balance theory (by letting positive 
blocks still appear on the diagonal and negative blocks off the diagonal), but also allows 
other options.  For example, in real world networks, some actors (particularly 
mediators) are universally liked, despite the division of actors predicted by social 
balance theory.  Some of the relationships of these actors would be categorized as 
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inconsistent in generalized blockmodeling, but would be allowed in relaxed 
blockmodeling.  “Differential popularity, differential receipt of negative ties, mediation 
blocks and actors with mutual negative ties can all be identified (Doreian & Mrvar, 
2009)” through Relaxed Blockmodeling. 
2.7 Measuring Imbalance in Signed Networks 
Since most signed networks are not exactly k-balanced, it is necessary to 
measure how imbalanced a signed network is when divided into k partitions.  Cartwright 
and Harary determined that the degree of balance of a signed graph is the “ratio of the 
number of positive cycles to the total number of cycles (Cartwright & Harary, 1956, p. 
288).”  If G is a signed graph, then b(G) is the degree of balance of G and is calculated in 
Equation 2.   
#  cycles( )
#  cycles
positiveb G
total
=   
Equation 2 
Since the number of positive cycles can go from zero to the total number of cycles, b(G) 
can vary between zero and one.  If b(G) is equal to one, then the graph is balanced.  One 
must take into account the structure of the signed graph in evaluating the value of b(G).  
In Figure 11, the balance of graphs a and b are b(a) = b(b) = 7/7 = 1, since there are 
seven balanced cycles and seven total cycles in each graph.  This indicates both a and b 
are balanced graphs.  In graph c, b(c) = 5/7, since there are five positive cycles and two 
negative cycles.  In graph d, b(d) = 3/7 because three positive cycles (i-j-h-i, i-h-k-i, and i-
j-h-k-i) are in the graph.  Therefore graphs c and d are both unbalanced, but graph c is 
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more balanced than graph d.  This ratio provides a method to measure imbalance in a 
network, but requires that all cycles be tested for balance.  Testing all cycles can be a 
lengthy process depending on the size of the network.   
Harary (1959) defined an additional way to measure imbalance by calculating the 
number of ties that need to be removed in order for the network to come into balance.  
This deletion-minimal set is equal to the negation-minimal set, the number of ties 
whose signs must be changed for the network to come into balance (Harary, Norman, & 
Cartwright, 1965, p. 350).  Doreian and Mrvar (2009) created an algorithm to calculate 
this second type of measurement as well as a partitioning procedure for signed 
networks.  Their algorithm calls for the calculation of all of the negative ties within 
subsets and the positive ties between subsets.  These two types of relations are 
inconsistent with a balanced network and therefore need to be negated or deleted, 
according to the second method of calculating imbalance, in order for the network to 
become balanced.  If a blockmodel does not fit the data perfectly, then there will be 
inconsistencies within the blockmodel.  Inconsistencies are defined as instances in which 
an empirical blockmodel is inconsistent with the specified blockmodel (Doreian, 
Batagelj, & Ferligoj, 2005, p. 23).  These inconsistencies can be used to determine how 
well the data and the blockmodel fit using a criterion function.   
2.8 Partitioning Signed Networks 
A number of different techniques to determine clusters or communities within 
weakly balanced signed networks (also known as k-balanced networks, see section 
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2.6.2) have been recently developed.  Doreian and Mrvar, in a 1996 article, present a 
local search strategy, starting with a random partition into k sets and moving to 
neighbor states to find the local optimal value of the criterion function.  This method is 
discussed in more detail in section 2.8.1 and is the primary method used in this thesis.  
In Chapter 10 of their book, Generalized Blockmodeling (2005), Doreian, Batagelj, & 
Ferligoj expound on the techniques and provide many examples from common SNA 
datasets.  The most relevant example to this thesis is the analysis of Read’s cultural data 
on the tribes in the Central Highlands of New Guinea (Read, 1954) in which they 
partitioned the network of tribes and identified a specific tribe that had unique 
relationships.   
The following are other examples in the literature that draw on structural 
balance principles to cluster actors within a network using various mathematical 
techniques.  Yang, Cheung, & Liu (2007) developed an agent-based heuristic to conduct 
a random walk on a signed graph to determine which community a node belongs.   
Bansal, Blum, & Chawla (2004) and Demaine, Emanuel, Fiat, & Immorlica (2006)  used 
approximation algorithms to conduct correlation clustering on signed graphs to 
minimize the disagreements and maximize the agreements between groups.  Kunegis, 
Lommatzsch, & Bauckhage (2009) analyzed the social network Slashdot Zoo using a 
clustering coefficient to evaluate the global network characteristics, centrality and 
popularity measures to evaluate node characteristics, and distance and similarity 
measures to evaluate link characteristics.  Kunegis, Schmidt, Lommatzsch, Lerner, De 
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Luca, & Albayrak (2010) use the spectral clustering algorithm to identify the top k 
eigenvetors of the signed graph Laplacian and run the k-means algorithm to calculate 
the clusters.  Chiang, Whang, & Dhillon (2012) extend this work to better apply to the k-
way clustering problem when k is greater than two.  Hsieh, Chiang, & Dhillon (2012) use 
matrix completion methods to fill in unknown relations within a network and then use a 
spectral clustering algorithm to determine the groups.  Anchuri & Magdon-Ismail (2012) 
propose a two step spectral approach to iteratively optimize modularity and frustration.   
2.8.1 Relocation Method. 
Doreian and Mrvar (1996) developed a local search heuristic to determine the 
best clustering option for network data called the relocation method.  This method uses 
a criterion function to determine how well a blockmodel fits the data.  The criterion 
function is then minimized to determine the local minimal optimum.  The criterion 
function is defined as:
𝑃(𝑪∗) = 𝑃(𝑪𝑪𝜖Ф𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) Equation 3
where C is a clustering of a given set of units U, Ф is the set of all possible clusters, and 
P:Ф→ R is the criterion function:
𝑃(𝑪)  =  𝑁 + 𝑃  Equation 4
where N is the number of negative ties within subsets and P is the number of positive 
ties between subsets.  A more general criterion function that allows the analyst to 
weight positive or negative inconsistencies differently is: 
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𝑃(𝑪) =  𝛼𝑁 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑃 Equation 5
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.  If α = 0.5, N is weighted the same as P and Equation 5 is the same as 
Equation 4.  If α < 0.5, then positive inconsistencies are weighted more.  If α > 0.5, then 
negative inconsistencies are more highly weighted.  The calculations in this thesis are 
conducted with α = 0.5 because little research has been conducted on the effects or 
reasons to weight one type of inconsistency higher than the other.  However, if such 
knowledge exists for a given group of interest, α could be varied to correspond to 
mission objectives. 
 In order to identify the least amount of inconsistencies, the criterion function 
must be minimized.  Doreian and Mrvar recommend using the relocation method to 
locate the local optimum.  Since this solution only finds the locally best solution and not 
the global optimum, the procedure must be repeated a large number of times to ensure 
that different initial clusters are used to gain confidence that the minimum solution to 
the criterion function is the actual global optimum.    The relocation method first 
defined by Doreian, Batagelj, and Ferligoj in Generalized Blockmodeling (2005, p. 150) 
and clarified by Brusco, Doreian, Mrvar, and Steinley (2011):  
1. Select a value of k. 
2. Randomly determine an initial clustering, C, with k clusters. 
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3. Repeat: If, in the neighborhood of the current clustering C, there exists a 
clustering C’ such that P(C’) < P(C), then move to C’. The neighborhood of a 
clustering C is determined by two transformations: 
 (a) moving a vertex from one cluster to another cluster and  
(b) interchanging two nodes between different clusters. This process is 
repeated many times (in the order of many thousands) to minimize the 
risk of reaching only a local minimum rather than a global minimum. 
4. Repeat the whole procedure for different values of k. 
2.8.1.1 Partitioning Weakly Balanced Networks. 
In order to identify if a network is weakly balanced (k-balanced), the criterion 
function needs to be tested for all values of k.  When the Doreian/Mrvar algorithm 
determines that P(C) = 0 when Ck is tested, then a network is weakly balanced at k.  
Since there are no inconsistencies when clustered into k subgroups, the network is k-
balanced.  If inconsistencies exist for all k where 0 ≤ k ≤ n (n = total number of nodes), 
then the network is not k-balanced. 
2.8.1.2 Partitioning Imbalanced Networks. 
In reality, most signed networks are not k-balanced.  In non-k-balanced 
networks, the criterion function will be greater than zero for all k.  To find the best 
partition of an imbalanced network, the lowest value of the criterion function is found.  
Doreian, Batagelj, and Ferligoj (2005, p. 305) prove that in all signed networks, there will 
be a unique lowest value for the criterion function.  This value will occur for partitions 
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with a single number of subgroups or for adjacent partitions in generalized 
blockmodeling.  For example, the criterion function will decrease as increasing values of 
k are tested.  The criterion function will reach a minimum and then begin to increase.  
The minimum value could be at one or a series of multiple k’s.  However, in relaxed 
blockmodeling, the criterion function decreases as k increases (Doreian & Mrvar, 2009).  
The relocation method is easy to use and has a fast computational time, but does not 
guarantee to find the optimal solution because it uses a local instead of a global search.  
The risk of finding a non-optimal solution can be mitigated by conducting the local 
search many times from different partitionings.   
Brusco, Doreian, Mrvar, and Steinley (2011) present a branch-and bound 
approach to address the problems with the relocation method, such as it may not find 
the optimal global partition or all the optimal partitions.  While the branch-and-bound 
method does produce an optimal solution, in large problems it can result in long 
computation times.  The relocation method can produce optimal or near optimal 
solutions (likely optimal, but undemonstrated in networks of k>30) in any size network 
with minimal computational difficulty (Brusco, Doreian, Mrvar, & Steinley, 2011). 
2.9 Social Network Analysis Metrics of Signed Networks 
 Section 2.7 demonstrated how to measure how balanced a signed network is by 
taking a ratio of the positive cycles over the total number of cycles or by measuring the 
minimum inconsistencies in a network.  While these methods are good when comparing 
networks or evaluating the whole network, often analysts are more interested in what 
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roles individual actors are playing within the network.  The Social Network Analysis 
metrics discussed in this section provide a way to assess individual actors within a 
network. 
2.9.1 Centrality. 
There are many centrality measures that are common within SNA, Wasserman 
and Faust (1994) provide a good explanation in Chapter Five of their book.  However, 
most centrality measures are not applicable to signed networks because, depending on 
the formula, calculations with negative numbers can give erroneous results.   When not 
applicable to signed networks, the measures can usually be applied to the unsigned 
adjacency matrix (by taking the absolute value) or to an adjusted matrix that considers 
just positive relations.  However, care must be taken to ensure that applying centrality 
to these different matrices is justified.  If applied haphazardly, centrality metrics will not 
provide the analyst with meaningful results.  Eigenvector centrality and likes minus 
dislikes are two possible methods for determining the centrality or prestige within 
signed networks.  Kunegis et al. (2009) identify additional popularity and centrality 
measures that can be used to evaluate signed social networks.  However, many of them 
are highly correlated. 
2.9.1.1 Degree Centrality. 
In any network, the degree of a node n, d(n), is the measurement of how many 
connections actor n has. It is calculated by summing the ties an actor has to other actors 
or by summing the row or column of the adjacency matrix (Wasserman & Faust, p. 163).  
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Since a directed network has a direction for the flow of influence it contains indegrees 
and outdegrees.  An indegree is calculated by summing the number of ties coming from 
other actors or by summing the number of 1’s in the column of the adjacency matrix.  
Likewise, an outdegree is calculated by summing the number of ties going from an actor 
to all actors it influences or by summing the number of 1’s in the row of the adjacency 
matrix (Wasserman & Faust, p. 126).  The degree of an actor in a network can be an 
indication to how central that actor is to the network.  In general, the higher the degree, 
the more connected the actor is within the network.  Sometimes, as is the case in dark 
social networks, an actor with high degree centrality may not tell the whole story.  For 
example someone with high degree centrality could be a highly influential actor, a 
messenger that has contact with a larger percentage of actors, or simply someone that 
practices poor operational security.  Assessing the degree of an actor in a signed 
network can be done several ways.  One can calculate the positive degree, the negative 
degree, or the positive minus the negative degree of actors within the network.  The 
positive degree will tell how many friends an actor has.  The negative degree will tell 
how many enemies an actor has and the positive minus the negative will tell if the actor 
has more friends than enemies within the network.  Additionally, the ratio of positive 
(or negative) degree over the total degree (both positive and negative) will denote the 
proportion of friends (enemies) the actor has within the network.  The ratio measure 
provides a better indication of how popular an actor is based on the relations that he or 
she has.  This makes the ratio measure a potentially preferable approach to use in 
sparse networks than the positive minus negative measure. 
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2.9.1.2 Eigenvector Centrality. 
Eigenvector Centrality is a measure of how central an actor is to the network 
based both on how many connections the actor has and the influence of connected 
actors.  This measurement attempts to measure both the number of connections as well 
as how important the connections are.  The most common way to measure eigenvector 
centrality was developed by Bonacich (1972) and is given in Equation 6.  This equation 
provides the centrality of the actor, x, by using the largest eigenvalue, λ, of a symmetric 
adjacency matrix, A. 
1x Ax
λ
=  Equation 6 
Bonacich and Loyd (2004) show eigenvector centrality can be used to examine 
the impacts of both positive and negative relationships on status.  Eigenvector centrality 
when applied to signed networks can increase the status of a node by having a positive 
connection to a high status node or a negative connection to a low status node.  It can 
also decrease the status of a node by having a negative connection to a high status node 
or a positive connection to a low status node.  Unfortunately, eigenvector centrality can 
only be used with non-directional data because a symmetric adjacency matrix is needed 
to ensure a positive eigenvalue (Bonacich & Lloyd, 2004).   
2.9.1.3 Betweenness Centrality. 
Betweenness Centrality measures how central an actor is to the network by 
measuring its connection between other actors.  If an actor is between two actors, then 
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it can influence the communication between the actors it connects.  Freeman (1977, p. 
37) defined gjk  as the number of geodesics, or arcs, linking nj and nk.  He defined gjk (ni) 
is the number of geodesics linking nj and nk that contain ni.  With the assumption that 
all geodesics are equally likely to be chosen for the path linking nj  and nk, Freeman 
accurately quantified the betweenness centrality with Equation 7.  Betweenness 
centrality can only be used on nonnegative edge weights.  Applying it to the unsigned 
adjacency matrix is possible, but provides little insight.  Since positive relations connect 
friends, the betweenness centrality should only be used to evaluate the positive 
relations of the network.  However, this does not take into account negative relations 
and therefore disregards potential meaningful data within the network.  
( ) ( ) /B i jk i jk
j k
C n g n g
<
=∑  
Equation 7 
 
2.9.2 Prestige. 
Many different Social Network Analysts have used different terms to describe 
the importance of actors within the network.  Centrality is a widely used term, but 
status, prestige, importance and prominence are other terms used to describe key 
actors.  These terms, while being similar, often have a variety of definitions.  Wasserman 
and Faust define prestige as being a measure within a directional network that 
evaluates an actor’s influence over the network based on who they have influence over 
(by evaluating the indegrees of the actor) (Wasserman & Faust, pp. 174-175).  The 
simplest measure of prestige is the total indegrees of each actor, or degree prestige, 
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PD(ni)=dI(ni).  When standardized to equal a number between zero and one, 
PD’(ni)=dI(ni)/(g-1) (Wasserman & Faust, pp. 202-203).  In a signed network with 
grouped ordinal data (-1, 0, 1), a common measure for centrality is a popularity 
measurement associated with the number of likes and dislikes.  As discussed in the 
degree centrality section, a node is observed and the number of negative arcs is 
subtracted from the number of positive arcs providing a signed centrality value.  If a 
network is directional, then negative indegree arcs are subtracted from positive 
indegree arcs to determine this measure of prestige.   
2.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides a history and background of AQIM and the conflict in Mali 
and outlines significant social network analysis tools as applied to signed networks and 
structural balance theory.  This chapter is the foundation on which the methodology in 
Chapter Three is developed and provides sufficient detail of the current situation in Mali 
to apply the methodology to the case studies in Chapters Four and Five.  After a brief 
introduction to basic graph theory and social network analysis terminology, structural 
balance theory is described.  Then, methods for identifying subgroups within a signed 
network are outlined.  If a network is balanced, it can be divided perfectly into two 
groups with no inconsistencies.  A network is weakly balanced (k-balanced) when it can 
be perfectly divided into k subgroups without any inconsistencies.  Weakly balanced 
networks have no cycles that have exactly one negative edge.  Nodes that are positively 
connected to each other are in the same subgroup in a k-balanced network.  Two 
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methods for measuring imbalance in signed networks help to quantify how balanced an 
unbalanced network is.  The existing literature for clustering signed social networks is 
covered and one particular method, Doreian and Mrvar’s relocation method, is 
described in detail.  Centrality measures applicable to signed data are defined as well.   
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3 Partitioning and Assessing Signed Social Networks 
3.1 Introduction 
 Having highlighted in Chapter Two the major contributions to signed social 
networks within the literature, this chapter provides a methodology to partition and 
assess the signed networks.  Data requirements and limitations are initially discussed.  
Measuring balance, the partitioning of signed networks, and evaluating the partitions 
are the key topics within the methodology.  Two different partitioning concepts, 
generalized blockmodeling and relaxed blockmodeling, are discussed. 
3.2 Data Requirements and Limitations 
Data to populate the model is as important as the model itself.  Unfortunately, 
when modeling dark networks, there is an inherent risk in not having complete data due 
to the secret nature of the organizations.  Additionally, social network models are just 
that, models, meaning that they are abstractions of the real thing.  Even when all 
relevant information is known about a network, decisions of what to include in the 
model and what to leave out are often necessary.  This creates a level of uncertainty as 
to how well the model represents the real life situation.  Any decisions based on the 
model must be made while considering both the assumptions of the model and other 
information known but not represented in the model. 
Data can be collected in a number of different ways.  It can be gathered in 
traditional ways including questionnaires, interviews, observations, historical records, 
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and experiments.  In addition, it may be collected via national technical means and 
traditional intelligence practices.  Once data is collected, it is necessary to review the 
data to ensure that it meets the requirements for the model.  In this case, we require 
data that reflects each relationship as positive, negative or neutral {1, -1, or 0}.  If data 
exists in another form, it must be converted into this form.  If the data calculates a 
relationship as a probability of having a positive (negative) relationship, a cut off value, β 
is required.  Any probability below β would be a null relationship, reflected as a zero.  
Any probability at or above β is a one (or negative one).  This method converts 
probability of having a positive or negative relationship into the appropriate format.  
Sometimes multiple binary datasets can be combined to make a grouped ordinal 
dataset.  In this case, one binary dataset represents positive relations where another 
dataset represents negative relations.  This data can be converted to the appropriate 
format by multiplying the negative relations adjacency matrix by negative one and 
adding the two matrices.  
3.3  Partitioning Signed Networks with Generalized Blockmodeling 
3.3.1 Partitioning a Balanced Network.  
 Once data is collected and properly formatted, it can then be analyzed to 
determine whether the network is balanced or not.  One way to identify a balanced 
network is to determine that all of its cycles are positive (Cartwright & Harary, 1956).  
The sign of a cycle is calculated by taking the product of the edges.  The easiest negative 
cycle to identify in a network graph is often one with only one negative line.  Even if only 
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one negative cycle exists in a large network of all other positive cycles, the network is 
unbalanced.  Guaranteeing a network is balanced is difficult in large networks because 
all cycles need to be identified and found positive in order to be sure it is balanced.  
Therefore, it is often easier in large networks to use a heuristic to check if a network is 
balanced.   
 The Doreian/Mrvar heuristic uses an optimization method to determine the best 
clustering option for network data.  This method, called the relocation method, uses a 
criterion function, P(C), to determine how well a blockmodel fits the data.  P(C) = N+P 
where N is the number of negative ties within subsets and P is the number of positive 
ties between subsets.  This criterion function was developed based on social balance 
theory and any value that is either a positive tie between subsets or a negative tie 
within a subset is defined as an inconsistency.  The criterion function is then minimized 
to determine the local minimal optimum.  Finding the partition with the least number of 
inconsistencies identifies the most balanced network possible with the given 
relationships.  Since the relocation method identifies a local optimal value, the minimum 
criterion function is repeatedly calculated to verify the minimum local optimal value is 
found.  This calculation is done for all values of k from one to n, the number of actors in 
the network.  The heuristic is presented in the following steps (Doreian, Batagelj, & 
Ferligoj, 2005, p. 150): 
1. Select a value of k. 
2. Randomly determine an initial clustering, C, with k clusters. 
 3-4 
 
3. Repeat: If, in the neighborhood of the current clustering C, there exists a 
clustering C’ such that P(C’) < P(C), then move to C’. The neighborhood of a 
clustering C is determined by two transformations: 
 (a) moving a vertex from one cluster to another cluster and  
(b) interchanging two nodes between different clusters. This process is 
repeated many times (in the order of many thousands) to minimize the 
risk of reaching only a local minimum rather than a global minimum. 
4. Repeat the whole procedure for different values of k. 
 If all of the cycles have been found to be positive or the minimum criterion 
function of the relocation method is equal to zero for some value k, then the network is 
balanced and can be partitioned without any inconsistencies into k subsets.  This 
partition completely supports structural balance theory and there is little to no tension 
within the network.  This type of network is the ideal situation when modeling people or 
groups of people.  However, this type of situation rarely exists in large, real-life 
networks.  If the minimum criterion function is greater than zero, the network is 
imbalanced.  The next section describes how to partition imbalanced networks.   
The relocation method can be quickly calculated using PAJEK software (Batagelj 
& Mrvar, 1996).  For this research PAJEK version 3.08 was used for all blockmodeling 
and relocation method calculations.  The number of repetitions used per k was 1,000 
and α = 0.5.  Figure 14 provides a flow chart of the entire methodology discussed in this 
chapter.  
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Figure 14: Methodology Flow Chart 
3.3.2 Partitioning Imbalanced Networks.  
 The Doreian/Mrvar heuristic used in the relocation method is an effective way to 
determine the optimal number of partitions for a given network.  As previously 
discussed, this method quickly solves the criterion function to find the minimum 
number of inconsistencies for all partitions one to n.  The number of partitions 
associated with the smallest criterion function identifies the best way to partition the 
network, so that the fewest inconsistencies exist with enough trials.  When the network 
is partitioned in this way, it is the most balanced it can be without changing any 
relations in the network.  As an example, if a network consisting of four nodes with the 
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relationships shown in Figure 15 is partitioned, none of the partitions result in zero 
inconsistencies.  Alternatively, this network is determined to be unbalanced because the 
cycle A-B-D-A has exactly one negative relationship.   
                       
Figure 15: Notional network matrix and graph with four actors.  Dashed lines 
represent negative relations and solid lines represent positive relations.   
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996)  
 Unfortunately, occasionally a network will have the same minimum number of 
inconsistencies for more than one value of k.  Additionally there can be multiple ways a 
network can be divided into k partitions with the same minimum number of 
inconsistencies.  In the unbalanced network in Figure 15, two values of k (k = 2 and k =3) 
result in the minimum of one inconsistency (see Table 4).  Since the minimum number 
of inconsistencies identifies the best partitioning of the network, this network is best 
partitioned into either two or three subsets.  This particular network can be partitioned 
into two different subsets of three making three total options that have the minimum 
number (one, in this case) of inconsistencies.   
Table 4: Inconsistencies of graph in Figure 15 
 
A B C D
A 1 -1 -1
B 1 1
C -1 -1
D -1 1 -1
a
c
b d
e
# of subsets 1 2 3 4
Minimum # of Inconsistencies (Criterion Function) 3 1 1 2
# of possible different subsets with Minimum # of Inconsistencies 1 1 2 1
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 If relationship c is removed, then the network would be balanced with two 
subsets {A,B,D} and {C}.  If the relationship b is removed, the network would be 3-
balanced with {A}, {C}, and {B,D} as the subsets.  If the relationship e is removed, the 
network is again 3-balanced, this time with {A,B}, {C}, and {D} as the subsets.  Therefore 
three different ways to partition this network have been found to make it as close to 
balanced as possible.  Using Equation 1, restated here as Equation 8, the total possible 
number of partitions of a four actor network can be determined to be fifteen.   
0
1( , ) ( 1)
!
k
k i n
i
k
S n k i
ik
−
=
 
= −  
 
∑
 Equation 8  
The relocation method finds the partitions that best fit a balanced network out of the 
total number of partitions.  In this simple case it narrows the number of partitions to 
investigate further to three from fifteen, allowing one to look deeper at the 
relationships in only these three groupings.   This is important because as networks 
grow, the number of partitions increases exponentially.  For example in Chapter Four, 
we will observe a seven actor network that can be partitioned 877 different ways, 
adding an eighth actor pushes the number up to 4,140, and Chapter Five’s ten actor 
network can be partitioned 115,929 different ways.  It is therefore necessary to have a 
method that quickly identifies a limited number of partitions that are close to balanced 
that can be analyzed more closely. 
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3.4 Partitioning Signed Networks with Relaxed Blockmodeling 
 While the generalized blockmodeling approach provides some depth and 
understanding to the situation, relaxed blockmodeling approaches the problem 
differently, providing different insights.  As the name suggests, relaxed blockmodeling 
relaxes the requirements of positive blocks being on the diagonal and negative blocks 
being off the diagonal.  This relaxation allows for exceptions to the social balance theory 
in order to identify unique relationships like mediators whose relations would otherwise 
be classified as inconsistencies.  The relaxed approach is based on the theory that there 
are other forces outside of structural balance theory that contribute to the clustering of 
actors within a network.  This approach still allows for structural balance theory (by 
letting positive blocks still appear on the diagonal and negative blocks off the diagonal), 
but also allows other options.  The relaxed blockmodeling approach should be 
conducted if there are multiple solutions for the generalized blockmodeling approach or 
if the minimum inconsistency found in the generalized blockmodeling approach is high.  
With the relaxed constraints, the relaxed blockmodeling approach may find a better 
partition or more logical fit to the network in these situations. 
 In relaxed blockmodeling the presence of positive and negative blocks and the 
criterion function remains the same, except now any signed block can appear anywhere 
within the blockmodel.  The criterion function for a relaxed blockmodel is most easily 
understood as: P(C) = N+P where N is the number of negative ties in positive blocks and 
P is the number of positive ties in negative blocks.  The same relocation method as used 
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in generalized blockmodeling is used in relaxed blockmodeling to determine the number 
of inconsistencies.  However, different from generalized blockmodeling, in relaxed 
blockmodeling the values of P(Ck) decline monotonically as k increases (Doreian & 
Mrvar, 2009).  Therefore as k gets higher, P(C) approaches zero.  When P(Ck) equals zero 
the network can be partitioned at k with zero inconsistencies.   
 When a relaxed blockmodel has zero inconsistencies and there are no negative 
blocks on the diagonal, then the graph can be reduced to the identified subsets without 
losing any information.  However, when there is a negative block on the diagonal where 
the actors in the diagonal negative block have the same relations to all other actors, but 
dislike each other, reducing would result in the actors in that block being identified as 
liking each other.  Therefore, if those actors are clustered into the same group to reduce 
the graph, the internal relationship between actors in that node needs to be kept track 
of as negative.   
 A mediator, a positive link that can negotiate between two dissenting actors, can 
be identified in several different ways.  In a relaxed blockmodel with zero 
inconsistencies, a negative block on the diagonal where the actors dislike each other, 
and a positive block in the same row or column, the mediator(s) is the actor(s) in the 
positive block.  Additionally, when a relaxed generalized blockmodel has zero 
inconsistencies and an actor (or in a reduced graph, group of actors) has more than one 
positive non-diagonal block in their column or row, the actor is a mediator between the 
actors in the positive blocks. The proof is trivial because there are zero inconsistencies, 
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making any actor with more than two non-diagonal positive blocks someone who likes 
the actors within those blocks while those actors cannot like each other or they would 
be in the same block.  
3.5 Evaluating the Partitioned Network 
3.5.1 Social Network Measures.  
 The popularity of an actor in a signed network can be a useful 
measurement because a more popular actor is assumed to have more influence within 
the network.   This thesis uses three different measures to calculate the popularity of 
individual actors within the network.  The three metrics for evaluating signed networks 
are likes minus dislikes, ratio of likes, and eigenvector centrality.  Likes minus dislikes is a 
quick snapshot of the network by subtracting the dislikes from the likes each actor has 
in the network.  This will return an integer value.  A positive value means the actor has 
more friends than enemies in the network, where a negative value means the opposite.  
The actors can then be ordered and compared to determine who might have the most 
influence within the network.   
The second measure, the ratio of positive (or negative) degree over the total 
degree (both positive and negative) will denote the proportion of friends (enemies) the 
actor has within the network.  The ratio measure provides a better indication of how 
popular an actor is based on the relations that he or she has.  For example, if actor A has 
three positive out of four total relations and actor B has one positive out of two 
 3-11 
 
relations, both will have a likes minus dislikes value of one, but actor A will have a 0.75 
ratio and actor B will have a 0.5 ratio.  This shows that the ratio measure is a potentially 
preferable approach to use in sparse networks than the positive minus negative 
measure.   
The third measure, eigenvector centrality is a measure of how central an actor is 
to the network based both on how many connections the actor has and the influence of 
connected actors.  This measurement attempts to measure both the number of 
connections as well as how important the connections are.   Eigenvector centrality 
provides the centrality of the actor, x, by using the largest eigenvalue, λ, of a symmetric 
adjacency matrix, A.  This relationship is shown in Equation 9. 
1x Ax
λ
=  Equation 9 
Eigenvector centrality when applied to signed networks can increase the status of a 
node by having a positive connection to a high status node or a negative connection to a 
low status node.  It can also decrease the status of a node by having a negative 
connection to a high status node or a positive connection to a low status node.  
Unfortunately, eigenvector centrality can only be used with non-directional data 
because a symmetric adjacency matrix is needed to ensure a positive eigenvalue 
(Bonacich & Lloyd, 2004).  In this thesis, eigenvector centrality was calculated using 
UCINET 6 for Windows (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). 
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3.5.2 Evaluating Inconsistencies. 
 Once the best fit partitioning of the network has been identified, they can be 
further examined.  One way to do this is by looking at the blockmodels of each of the 
partitions and identifying the inconsistencies in each blockmodel.  Recall, from section 
2.6.3.3, that a positive value in a block off the diagonal and a negative value inside a 
diagonal block is an inconsistency in generalized blockmodeling. To determine which 
relationships are under the most tension to change, sum the total number of 
inconsistencies belonging to each relationship identified from all of the subsets with the 
minimum number of inconsistencies.  The three blockmodels for the best partitions of 
the notional network in section 3.3.2 are shown in Figure 16.  Within each blockmodel is 
an inconsistency that is highlighted.  For this simple example, inconsistencies are found 
once in three different relationships.  However, if one relationship was found more 
often, this relationship would be identified as having more tension and therefore would 
be more likely to change. 
       
Figure 16: Blockmodels for notional four actor symmetric network 
 Suppose that the individuals in our example are Adam, Barb, Chris and Donna (A, 
B, C, and D respectively).  Adam and Barb are married.  Donna and Barb are friends, but 
A B D C
A 1 -1 -1
B 1
D -1
C
3 subsets, 1 
Inconsistency
A B D C
A 1 -1 -1
B 1
D -1
C
3 subsets, 1 
Inconsistency
A B D C
A 1 -1 -1
B 1
D -1
C
2 subsets, 1 
Inconsistency
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Barb’s husband, Adam does not get along with Donna.  Chris is an acquaintance of Adam 
and Donna, but neither of them like him much.  Barb and Chris do not know each other.  
As discussed previously there are three different ways to partition this network where 
each partition has one inconsistency.  The far left blockmodel identifies the Adam/Barb 
relationship as being inconsistent.  Given what is known about the network, the 
Adam/Barb relationship is probably the strongest (since they are married) and therefore 
is unlikely to change.   
The other two blockmodels identify Donna’s relationships with Barb and Adam.  It 
is likely that one of these two relationships will change to make the network balanced.  
One option is that Barb will stop associating with Donna because Adam does not like 
her.  The other option is that Adam will tolerate (and maybe eventually begin liking) 
Donna to preserve Barb’s relationship with her.  In all situations Chris is in a group by 
himself.   
In evaluating the best partition of a network, additional analysis is required (such 
as how much one likes/dislikes another) to identify which relationship is most 
vulnerable to change.  For example, the Adam/Barb relationship may be the most 
vulnerable to change if the analyst knows that Adam and Barb have been having marital 
problems.  On the other hand, if Donna is identified as Barb’s mother, the source of 
tension within the network may suddenly make sense.  In this case, the Adam/Donna 
relationship is one that both parties will likely try to improve to move the network into 
balance, resulting in less strife at home.  The model does not take these types of 
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relationships into account but rather requires SME’s to apply the intangible details of 
relationships to identify the appropriate partition when multiple partitions exist.  The 
model reduces the number of partitions into a manageable amount to evaluate 
individually and aids in highlighting relationships that may require more detailed 
analysis.  
3.6 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provides the basic understanding for how a signed network can be 
partitioned and evaluated.  A small example was provided demonstrating how to 
measure imbalance within a network by identifying inconsistencies via generalized 
blockmodeling.  Relaxed blockmodeling was presented as an alternative to generalized 
blockmodeling when there are many minimum P(C) solutions or when there is a high 
minimum inconsistency identified in the generalized blockmodeling approach.  Once the 
best solution or solutions are found by minimizing the criterion function, they should be 
evaluated by subject matter experts to identify potential causes for the inconsistencies.  
Chapters Four and Five provide case studies that further apply the methodology 
described in this chapter. 
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4 Mali Militant Groups Case Study Pre-French Intervention 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to apply the outlined methodology to seven militant groups in 
Mali to identify the alliances of these groups and to determine which relationships are 
susceptible to change or which relationships may be mischaracterized by current 
understanding.  The values assessed in the model presented in this chapter are based on 
relationships prior to the 11 January 2013 French involvement in the Malian conflict.   
There are 877 different ways to partition a network with seven actors (Equation 
1, page 2-41).  However, most of these ways, while mathematically possible, do not 
make sense based on the known relationships between the actors.  Due to the complex 
web of relationships, it is often difficult to find a partition that does not misrepresent at 
least one relationship.  In an unbalanced network there is always a relationship or 
relationships that contradicts what two actors would be expected to maintain when 
looking at the relationships in the rest of the network.  The methodology outlined in 
Chapter Three identifies the best possible partitions within the network to minimize 
those inconsistencies.  The partitions that are found can provide indications to how a 
network’s web of relationships may evolve and can provide intelligence analysts 
additional insight into the groups or alliances that form.  Additionally it can indentify 
actors that fill the role as mediators between groups or potentially find misclassified 
relationships or erroneous data within the network.  
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4.2 Background 
Until recently Mali was considered a democratic model in Africa (Aziz, 2013).  
However, in March 2012 a military coup ousted Malian President Amadou Toumani 
Touré.  In the aftermath of the coup, basic governance and security broke down in 
Northern Mali allowing for a disgruntled Tuareg movement to rebel against the state.  
This movement, initiated by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA) and later co-opted by Islamic extremists, is the most recent in a series of Tuareg 
rebellions in Mali.  Within the conflict in Northern Mali, there are a number of key 
groups that are influential in shaping the events.  The relationships between these 
actors are explored in order to identify subsets of potential alliances and potential 
vulnerabilities.   
4.3 Key Actors 
 The study in this chapter explores the relationships between seven actors: AQIM, 
MUJAO, AAD, MNLA, Arab Militias, the Patriotic Forces of Resistance (PFR) and Mali 
government affiliated forces in 2012, prior to French involvement on 11 January 2013.  
Each of these actors and their relations to each other are discussed in this section.  
Section 2.2 has a detailed overview on AQIM and should be referenced for historical, 
geographic and cultural significance of AQIM and the region as a whole.  Section 2.2.4 
provides additional background on some of the key actors affiliated with AQIM (MNLA, 
AAD, MUJAO), and whose relationships are analyzed in this chapter.  Table 5 provides an 
overview of the key actors described in section 4.3. 
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Table 5: Key Actors in Northern Mali (Pre-French intervention) 
 
4.3.1 National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). 
 The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) is a largely secular 
group whose goal is to liberate and establish a separate government in the area they 
refer to as Azawad, the desert region in Northern Mali.  The movement is largely made 
up of ethnic Tuareg fighters.  There were previously at least three Tuareg rebellions, 
fighting Mali for independence.  The most recent rebellion, fueled by returning fighters 
and weapons from post-Gaddafi Libya, began in January 2012.  Members of the Malian 
military, unhappy with how the government was handling the rebellion, coordinated a 
coup on 22 March.  Following the coup, the government forces put up little resistance, 
allowing the MNLA, with assistance from extremist Islamic fighters, to gain control over 
large portions of Northern Mali.  In April 2012 the MNLA issued a declaration of 
Number Group Ideology Goal Ethnicity Area of Operation Like Dislike
1 MNLA Secular A secular, independent 
government in Azawad
Primarily Tuareg Kidal 3 2,4,5,6
2 AQIM
Extreme 
Islamic
Establish an Islamic 
Caliphate throughout 
Muslim world
Algerian leadership, 
African participants
Timbuktu/ 
Dispersed across 
Northern Mali
3,4 1,6,7
3 AAD
Extreme 
Islamic
Establish an Islamic 
State of Mali with 
Shari'a Law enforced
Primarily Tuareg leaders, 
other ethnic participants Kidal/Timbuktu 1,2,4 6,7
4 MUJAO
Extreme 
Islamic
Establish an Islamic 
Caliphate throughout 
Muslim world
Mauritanian leader, 
African participants Gao/Menaka 2,3 1,6,7
5 Arab 
Militias
Islamic Defend and protect 
there own interests
Arab Lere/Timbuktu 6 1,7
6
Malian 
Govt Secular
Regain control of their 
territory and defeat the 
rebel movement
Bambara, Peuhl, Senufo, 
Songhai, Dogon, Malinke 
and others
Mopti, Sevare 5,7 1,2,3,4
7 FPR Secular
Regain control of lost 
Mali territory and defeat 
the rebel 
movement/Revenge
Songhai, Peuhl, Bozo, 
Bella and others
Originally Gao and 
Douentza, moved 
south when 
Islamists took over 
North
6
1,2,3,4,
5
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independence for Azawad.  Shortly after independence, Ansar Al-Din and MUJAO began 
enforcing Shari’a law in areas they controlled.  The MNLA, in favor of a more tolerant 
form of Islamic government, objected to imposing Shari’a on the population.  This led to 
disagreements between the MNLA and the Islamic extremist organizations.  Battles 
began to take place throughout Northern Mali with MNLA losing control of much of the 
territory to Ansar Al-Din and MUJAO (BBC News, 2012).  Once consisting of thousands of 
fighters, MNLA’s power seemingly diminished with power and influence shifting to 
Ansar Al-Din.  As a result, the MNLA reengaged with the Malian government for support 
against extremists (Oumar, 2012) and attempted to negotiate with moderate Tuareg 
members in Ansar Al-Din to establish a more united Tuareg organization (El Hadi, 2012). 
 The MNLA has negative relations with AQIM and MUJAO and repeatedly claims 
to oppose all terrorists (McGregor, 2012).  The relationship between MNLA and Ansar 
Al-Din is complicated.  Both groups are led by and have active memberships from the 
influential Ifoghas Tuareg tribe.  This study characterizes the relationship as positive due 
to strong bonds that exist between Tuareg members within both organizations.  Since 
April, the MNLA and Ansar Al-Din have had conflicting relations due to their differences 
in ideology, mainly the implementation of Shari’a law (Jacinto, 2012).  The MNLA and 
Ansar Al-Din have had an off and on relationship since the establishment of both 
organizations.  They briefly merged in May and both signed an agreement in December 
2012 for a ceasefire with the government (Reuters, 2013).  However, neither of these 
agreements lasted long (the December deal was rescinded by AAD on 3 January 2013).  
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FPR, Arab militias, and government militias generally have negative relations with the 
MNLA based mostly on ethnic differences that have historically caused conflict and 
disagreements.   
4.3.2 Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 
 Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an Al-Qa’ida affiliated terrorist 
organization formerly known as the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC).  
On 11 September 2006, Al-Qa’ida’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announced 
the merger of GSPC with Al-Qa’ida.  In January 2007, the GSPC announced their new 
name: Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb.  The name change reflected the evolution of 
the organization from a local to a global jihad with the goal of establishing an Islamic 
Caliphate and conducting jihad on anyone opposed to their mission.  AQIM then began 
to target foreign countries and operate outside the borders of Algeria, especially in Mali 
and Mauritania (Harmon, 2010, p. 16).  In recent years, due in part to Algerian success in 
targeting AQIM leadership based in Algeria, AQIM has found the openness of the Sahara 
an ideal place to operate.  AQIM’s history of smuggling operations within this region has 
allowed them to expand relationships with the local population to facilitate their 
operations.  When the conflict in Northern Mali started, AQIM was positioned to 
capitalize on those relationships and use the weapons, money and influence they 
possess to enable Islamic extremists to control most of Northern Mali.  While it is 
unclear the level of interaction between the different extremist organizations, AQIM is 
active and involved in Northern Mali.  It is closely aligned in ideology to MUJAO and 
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Ansar-Al Din while the MNLA, FPR and Malian government militias are opposed to 
AQIM. 
4.3.3 Ansar Al-Din (AAD). 
 Ansar Al-Din (“Supporters of Religion” or “Defenders of Faith”) is a new 
organization inside Mali led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, one of the leaders in the Tuareg rebellion 
in the 1990’s.  There are strong indications that Ansar Al-Din is associated with AQIM, 
based on their common goal of establishing an Islamic state and the connections of Ag 
Ghaly with some of AQIM’s leaders (Metcalf, 2012).  Ansar Al-Din fought alongside the 
MNLA in Northern Mali, but after taking control of Azawad, the differences between 
MNLA and Ansar Al-Din became too great.  In the Battle of Gao, on 27 June 2012, Ansar 
Al-Din and MUJAO defeated the MNLA and took control of many of the cities in 
Northern Mali (BBC News, 2012).  Ansar Al-Din and MNLA are both led by individuals 
from the Ifoghas Tuareg tribe, making them close despite the conflict.  Ansar Al-Din’s 
goals differ from the MNLA in that they want Mali to remain united and for Shari’a law 
to govern the whole country (BBC News, 2012).  Ansar Al-Din appears to represent the 
people of Azawad better than any of the other organizations analyzed.  It’s make up is 
different throughout Northern Mali with Arab, Songhai and other ethnic groups 
represented within the organization, especially in areas where those ethnicities make up 
the majority of the population, such as Timbuktu (Tanchum, 2012).  Being more diverse 
can be a strength or a weakness, as it provides them with a wider base, but potentially 
more conflicting voices. 
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 Based on the reasons discussed in the previous paragraph, Ansar Al-Din has 
positive relations with AQIM, MUJAO, and MNLA.  FPR groups and Ansar Al-Din have 
negative relations based on ideology and historical ethnic conflicts.  Some may argue 
that the relation between Ansar Al-Din and the government of Mali should be classified 
as negative based on Ansar Al-Din’s current relationships with AQIM and MUJAO and 
their statements and actions of implementing Shari’a law throughout Mali.  However, 
the previous Mali government has a long history of dealing with Ag Ghaly who has a 
history of making deals with all parties, therefore this study characterizes this relation as 
null (neither positive nor negative).  Additionally, Ansar Al-Din has already shown a 
willingness to come to the table for negotiations, something that AQIM and MUJAO are 
unlikely to do (Reuters, 2013). 
4.3.4 The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). 
 The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (French: Mouvement pour 
le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest) (MUJAO) is an AQIM off-shoot in West 
Africa.  The organization is led by Mauritanian national Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou 
(a.k.a. Abou QumQum) and is seen by many as a way to expand the mission of AQIM.  
Other analysts see the creation of MUJAO as evidence of AQIM splintering due to the 
native Algerian leadership’s unwillingness to allow non-Algerians to rise through the 
ranks (Cristiani, 2012).   MUJAO appears to be made up of mostly Moors and Arab 
people from West Africa.  MUJAO is closely aligned with AQIM and parts of Ansar-Al Din.  
It is in conflict with MNLA, FPR and the Malian government militias.  This study classifies 
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the relationship between MUJAO and Arab militias as null since they tend to operate in 
the same areas and tolerate each other, but they have different backgrounds and 
ideologies.  
4.3.5 Arab Militias. 
Historically Arab militias have operated in the Timbuktu and Gao regions with 
the government’s support4.  Arab militias have previously been used by the government 
to fight against Tuareg separatists and help protect the northern Arab population during 
the previous Tuareg rebellions.  Using Arab and Tuareg militias to assist in fighting the 
Tuareg rebellions exacerbated long term ethnic problems within and between different 
northern communities.  Although at times legitimized and even commanded by Malian 
army officers, these militias are widely believed to participate in the illegal smuggling 
networks that operate throughout Northern Mali.  Additionally, these militias both 
compete and cooperate with Tuareg and Islamic groups that participate in similar 
smuggling activities.  This illicit network of smuggling drugs, cigarettes and other goods 
has encouraged the establishment of private militias throughout Northern Mali to 
protect both legitimate and non-legitimate business interests (van Vliet, 2012).  The 
Arab Militias have had a generally good relationship with the Malian government.  It is 
difficult to say what policy the new government, when in place, will take towards these 
militias.  The Arab militias have historically negative ties to the FPR affiliated groups and 
                                                     
4 “The principal Arab (Moors) groups residing in northern Mali are the Kunta and Telemsi (concentrated in 
the Gao region) and the Berabiche (of which a majority reside in Timbuktu, but who are scattered around 
the entire region).  They formed the backbone of the militant Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA)” (van 
Vliet, 2012).   
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to the MNLA and most Tuareg groups.  Their relation with the Islamic militants is null 
because in at least some cases, militias continue to operate throughout their normal 
territory and have been able to coexist with the extremists.  In some cases, Arab militias 
may be participating with certain Islamic extremist groups to achieve like interests.  
4.3.6 Mali Government Affiliated Forces. 
 Mali’s military has historically been “underpaid, poorly equipped, and in need of 
rationalization (Library of Congress, 2005)”.  Additionally, efforts to incorporate former 
Tuareg rebels into the Army created infighting and a struggle for power between the 
competing military commanders.  Following the coup, the Army that was stationed in 
Northern Mali dissolved.  Three senior Malian officers still have troops and the desire to 
fight to regain Northern Mali.  Colonel al-Hajj Gamou is a Tuareg that escaped into Niger 
when the Malian army disintegrated in the region.  He reportedly has 600 pro-
government Tuareg fighters to assist in retaking the north (McGregor, 2012).  Colonel 
Ould Meydou, an Arab, took refuge in Mauritania and can return to fight with the 
approximately 1,000 man Arab force that he commands (McGregor, 2012).  Colonel 
Didier Dakuo commands approximately 2,000 regular army soldiers with some vehicles 
and equipment at the military base in Sévaré, just south of the territory the Islamists 
control (McGregor, 2012).  These forces remains poorly equipped and suffer from 
mistrust, poor discipline and a lack of leadership.  Additional Malian military was 
disbanded in the aftermath of the coup.  Mali has a small Air Force and Navy, but their 
equipment is old and poorly maintained (Library of Congress, 2005).  The Mali 
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government forces (at least some pro-government militias) have existing positive 
relations with the Arab militias.  The FPR are decidedly pro-government and will support 
government forces in any action.  Government forces are opposed to the Islamists 
occupying Northern Mali including MNLA, Ansar Al-Din, AQIM and MUJAO.   
4.3.7 Patriotic Forces of Resistance (FPR). 
 Several self-defense militias have operated in Mali since the 1990’s.  Although 
the Malian government has previously made efforts to crack down on them or 
incorporate them into the Army, the recent conflict has produced a large number of 
pro-government militias.  Recently six of them have joined together to make up the 
Patriotic Forces of Resistance (FPR) (Look, 2012).  The two largest groups making up the 
FPR are the Ganda Koy (Lords of the Land) and Ganda Iso (Son of the Land) with 
estimated forces of 2,000 and 1,300 fighters respectively (Jamestown Foundation, 
2012).  These militias have received training and logistical support from the Malian 
Army, but have not been given arms or a formal role in the attempt to retake the North.  
In addition to the Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso, the other groups in the coalition are: the 
Liberation Forces of the Northern Regions (FLN), the Alliance of Communities from the 
Timbuktu Region (ACRT), the Armed Force against the Occupation (FACO) and the 
Thought and Action Circle (CRA) (Jamestown Foundation, 2012). These predominately 
Songhai and Peuhl/Fulani groups blame the MNLA and the Islamic groups for raping, 
killing and stealing from them in addition to forcing Shari’a law upon them.  Human 
Rights Watch reports that “these militias, as well as youth groups made up of members 
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of northern ethnic groups – the Songhai, Peuhl, Bozo, and Bella – had apparent plans to 
“settle scores” with their perceived northern opponents (Human Rights Watch, 
December 2012).”  There have been reports of “kill lists” being created as well.  While 
there is a rich history of ethnic coexistence within Mali, there seems to be a genuine 
concern that the recent alleged war crimes on all sides, if left unaddressed, could 
continue and grow worse if these groups are used by the Malian government to attempt 
to retake control over Northern Mali.  For all of these reasons, the FPR have positive 
relations with the Malian government affiliated forces and negative relations with the 
MNLA and each of the extreme Islamist groups.  The FPR also generally have negative 
relations with the Arab militias due to ethnic differences.  The Malian government 
historically pits different militias against each other in order to maintain control, thereby 
worsening ethnic cleavages (van Vliet, 2012).   
4.4 Assessing Relationships between Actors 
 The previously identified groups and their relationships as discussed in Section 4.3 outline the 
background and provide the basis for the analysis.  The relations between these groups are shown in the matrix in  
 
Table 6.  It should be noted that the relationships in this illustrative example are the 
assessment of the author, based on open source literature.  Actual relationship values 
should be provided by regional, cultural and subject matter experts.   
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Table 6: Mali actor’s relationship matrix (Pre-French Intervention) 
 
 This set of relationships creates a symmetric matrix because all relationships are reciprocated (if actor i 
likes actor j, then actor j also likes actor i).  The matrix in  
 
Table 6 is displayed in graph form in Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17: Network of relationships from  
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AQIM -1 1 1 -1 -1
AAD 1 1 1 -1 -1
MUJAO -1 1 1 -1 -1
Arab Militias -1 1 -1
Malian Govt -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1
FPR -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1
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Table 6 shown in graph form.                   Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & 
Mrvar, 1996) 
4.5 Partitioning Actors into subsets 
4.5.1 Generalized Blockmodeling. 
 When looking at the graph in Figure 17, partitioning the network into two 
subsets may seem obvious due to the negative lines drawn between Arab militias, 
Malian government, and FPR in one group (referred to as group A) and everyone else in 
the other (group B).  However, when looking at each of these subsets, they are not 
balanced because there are three negative relationships within subsets (three 
inconsistencies; MNLA-AQIM, MNLA-MUJAO and FPR-Arab Militias).  Since initial 
partitioning is not balanced, additional partitioning options need to be explored.  
Therefore the relocation method can be used to calculate the minimum inconsistency 
for all k using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996) with α = 0.5.  As Table 7 shows, when the 
network is partitioned into three or four subsets, the least number of inconsistencies 
exist and the network best fits a partition of three or four subsets.  In each case, two 
inconsistencies exist demonstrating that if two relationships are negated, reversed or 
deleted, then the network will become balanced and there will be significantly less 
tension.  There are two different possible subsets that have two inconsistencies when 
partitioning into both three and four subsets.  Therefore there are four different 
solutions that solve the minimum inconsistencies criterion function.   
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Table 7: Minimum inconsistencies for all possible partitions 
 
 To determine which of the subgroups with the minimum number of 
inconsistencies makes the most sense, further analysis is required.  Initially the four 
blockmodels that provide the minimum answer to our criterion function should be 
observed.  These blockmodels are shown in Figure 18.   
 
Figure 18: Blockmodels of the four different partitions found by minimizing the 
criterion function.  (Matrices are symmetric.  Highlighted blocks show inconsistencies.) 
In evaluating these blockmodels, the inconsistent relationships should be summed for 
all of the different blockmodels.  This results in MNLA/AAD relationship being identified 
in every blockmodel, a total of four times, Arab militias/Mali government relationship 
# of subsets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Minimum # of Inconsistencies (Criterion Function) 10 3 2 2 3 5 6
# of possible different subsets with Minimum # of Inconsistencies 1 1 2 2 1 6 1
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being identified two times, and Arab militias/FPR and Mali government/FPR each 
identified once.   
 Since the MNLA/AAD relationship is identified as an inconsistency in every 
minimum inconsistency blockmodel, it is clearly a relationship that should be studied 
further.  This relationship should be reevaluated to determine if is misclassified and 
should be classified as negative or if it has been found because there is a great deal of 
tension and pressure for this relationship to change.  Since the people within these two 
groups are culturally intertwined, given that these two groups are largely Tuareg, it 
seems possible that this relationship will remain positive and not change to negative.  
The sticking point in the relationship is that Ansar Al-Din has a much more religious 
stance than the MNLA and is linked with AQIM and MUJAO.  However, in the event of a 
UN backed military mission, Ansar Al-Din may be forced to choose sides.  AAD can be 
expected to choose the side that they perceive will enable them the most long term 
power and influence.  This study hypothesized that AAD would denounce violence and 
extremism and fall into the subgroup of MNLA.  This would make AAD’s relationship 
with AQIM and MUJAO negative and keep their relationship with MNLA positive.   
 The relationship with the second most inconsistencies is the Arab militias/Mali 
government relationship.  This relationship is in two of the blockmodels, Figure 18b and 
Figure 18c.  In both of these instances the relationship should be changed from positive 
to negative to make it consistent.  When this relationship was initially evaluated, it was 
rated as positive because of the Malian government’s history of working with Arab 
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militias to fight Tuareg insurgencies.  However, the Arab militias seem to be complicit 
with some extremists and if that continues the Malian government may wish to cut ties 
with the Arab militias.  Therefore, this relationship is under tension to change and could 
be targeted with influence operations to assist in facilitating that change.   
 The other two relationships were identified as inconsistencies only one time.  In 
Figure 18a, the relationship that is inconsistent with the blockmodel is between Arab 
Militia and FPR.  Even though this is identified as a source of tension in this model, it is 
not likely to change due to the deep ethnic divide between the two groups.  In Figure 
18d the relationship that is inconsistent with the blockmodel is between the Malian 
government and FPR.  While it can be argued that these groups have a negative or null 
relationship, they are firmly in the same camp with regards to Northern Mali and the 
insurgents there.  Therefore, this relationship is not likely to turn negative unless they 
take up arms without government permission to avenge past wrongs.  The relationship 
could turn null if the Malian government addresses some of the FPR’s concerns on 
human rights abuses and limits future ethnic conflict escalation.  In this case, the FPR 
organizations would likely cease to be influential within the network.  
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Figure 19: Network graphs of the four different partitions.  Graphs by author using 
Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996) 
If the two relationships with the most inconsistencies were to change, it would create a 
balanced network.  Since the Arab Militia relationships are currently sparse, the Arab 
Militia could be included in either the Islamist extremist or the FPR/Malian government 
subsets or form its own.   Better intelligence indicating the Arab militias actual relations 
with AAD, AQIM and MUJAO would indicate which subset into which they should be 
placed. 
Negative Relation
Positive Relation
egative Relation
ositive Relation
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Figure 20: Balanced blockmodels and graphs if the two relationships under the most 
tension (AAD/MNLA and Arab Militas/Mali government) were influenced to change.  
(Matrices are symmetric) 
 
 After the previous analysis was conducted, on 23 January 2013, AAD effectively 
split.  The splinter group, the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA), led by an important 
tribal leader, Algabass Ag Intallah, renounced terrorism and extremism in favor of a 
negotiated peace to the Mali conflict (Beaumont, 2013).  The goal of IMA is to set up an 
autonomous region in Northern Mali, as opposed the MNLA’s initial goal of complete 
independence.  The establishment of this group is an indication of the pressure the 
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AAD/MNLA relationship was under to change.  This model identified the tension within 
this relationship.  While the model does not predict what actions the actors would take, 
it did suggest the relationship merited further analysis.  In this case, the group splintered 
creating new relational dynamics.  Chapter Five observes these changes and analyzes in 
more detail the actors and relationships of the conflict following French and African 
forces involvement and the creation of the IMA. 
4.5.2 Relaxed Blockmodeling. 
 When Relaxed Blockmodeling is conducted on the same network of seven actors, 
it is subdivided into five subsets with no inconsistencies.  See Figure 21 for the network 
graph and Figure 22 for the relaxed fit image matrix showing the subsets and relations 
of the relaxed fit.  In this partitioning, AQIM and MUJAO are grouped together because 
they have the same ties to all other actors and like each other.  In addition, FPR and the 
Arab Militias are grouped.  This grouping is contradictory to social balance theory 
(negative block on the diagonal) but is allowed with the relaxed rules.  This grouping 
makes sense because they have the same relations with all common actors and 
mutually dislike each other.  When a relaxed blockmodel has zero inconsistencies and 
there are no negative blocks on the diagonal, then the graph can be reduced to the 
identified subsets without losing any information.  However, when there is a negative 
block on the diagonal, the actors in the diagonal negative block have the same relations 
to all other actors, but dislike each other.  Therefore, if those actors are clustered into 
the same group to reduce the graph, the internal relationship between actors in that 
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node needs to be kept track of as negative.  For example, the seven actor network can 
be reduced to a five actor network as identified in the relaxed blockmodel.  However, 
the FPR/Arab Militias grouping would be a negative node since they do not like each 
other, but have the same relation to all others.  This demonstrates that despite the 
historic ethnic tension between the two groups, they actually have common friends and 
enemies.  This suggests that there may be a basis for cooperation and mutual 
understanding between these two historic rivals. 
 
Figure 21: Network graph showing the five subsets found by the Relaxed 
Blockmodeling method.  By author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996). 
 
Negative Relation
Positive Relation
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Figure 22: Image matrix blockmodeling the seven militant groups into five subsets. 
Red is negative and black is positive.  By author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996). 
 A mediator can be identified when Relaxed Blockmodeling has a negative block 
on the diagonal and zero inconsistencies.  The mediator is identified by finding a positive 
block horizontal or vertical to the negative diagonal block.  In the current example, the 
Malian government affiliated forces have a positive block horizontal and vertical to the 
negative diagonal block.  The Malian government makes sense as a mediator since both 
the FPR and the Arab militias have a positive relation with Malian government affiliated 
forces, but dislike each other. 
4.6 Additional Social Network Analysis 
 As discussed in 2.9, other metrics can be used to provide insight on the 
composition of signed networks.  Three of the most useful metrics to evaluating signed 
networks are the popularity measure of likes minus dislikes, ratio of likes over total 
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relations and eigenvector centrality.  Likes minus dislikes is a quick snapshot of the 
network by measuring each actor’s popularity within the network.  Popularity of an 
actor in a signed network can be a useful measurement because a more popular actor is 
assumed to have more influence within the network.   The likes minus dislike values and 
the ratio of number of likes over total relations for the Malian groups are in Table 8.  A 
negative value in the likes minus dislikes column means that the actor is disliked more 
than they are liked.  Positive means they have more friends than enemies.  The FPR and 
MNLA have the lowest popularity and AAD has the highest. This puts AAD in a position 
where they have more influence throughout the network than any other group.  
Observe that the top three like minus dislike rankings are the three Islamist groups.  One 
must look back to the network to determine why these groups are the highest.  These 
groups have almost identical relationships to the rest of the network (AQIM and MUJAO 
are identical) while the rest of the actors in the network have unique relationships.  This 
suggests that the Islamists are much more united than the other groups.  This result is 
expected based on the extremist groups working together to control Northern Mali, 
while the remaining actors have various negative relations between them.   
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Table 8: Popularity measures of actors: Likes minus Dislikes and Ratio of Likes/Total 
relations (sorted from highest to lowest) 
 
 Eigenvector centrality is another measure of popularity that considers additional 
details of a network than just an actor’s first hand relationships.  An actor’s centrality 
value will increase by having a positive connection to a high status actor or a negative 
connection to a low status actor.  Likewise, an actor’s centrality will decrease if it has a 
negative connection to a high status actor or a positive connection to a low status actor.  
The eigenvector centralities for the Malian groups are in Table 9.   
Table 9: Eigenvector Centrality (sorted from highest to lowest). Calculations by author 
using UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) 
 
 Notice that the top three highest rated groups are the same as in Table 8 and 
Arab militias and FPR are in roughly the same position as well.  The MNLA, which had 
Militant 
Group
Likes minus 
Dislikes
Ratio: # Likes over 
Total Relations
AAD 1 0.6
AQIM -1 0.4
MUJAO -1 0.4
Arab Militias -1 0.333
Malian Govt -2 0.333
FPR -4 0.167
MNLA -4 0.167
Militant 
Group
Eigenvector 
Centrality
AAD 0.465
AQIM 0.404
MUJAO 0.404
MNLA 0.154
Arab Militias -0.042
FPR -0.456
Malian Govt -0.473
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the worst like minus dislike rating, has a positive value for eigenvector centrality.  The 
MNLA benefits from its positive relation to the most central actor (AAD) and its negative 
relations to the two least central actors (FPR and Malian Govt).  The Malian government 
militias’ popularity changed in the two measurements as well.  Its popularity is effected 
both by liking lower groups and disliking the higher groups.  One interesting thing to 
note is that the eigenvector centrality rankings, when grouped, will provide the same 
partition as identified via structural balance theory and depicted in Figure 20b; {AAD, 
AQIM, MUJAO}, {MNLA}, {Arab Militias}, and {FPR, Malian Govt}.   
 The techniques in this section identify ways to assess individual actors within the 
network.  Each actor can be compared to the rest of the network to gauge their 
popularity.  Popularity can be an indication for how influential an actor is.  In all three 
measurements AAD was the most popular actor.  This observation provides an 
indication for why AAD has been growing both in numbers and power throughout 
Northern Mali during the last half of 2012.  Fighters were leaving MNLA and the FPR and 
joining AAD based on the power and influence the group wielded (Boisvert, 2012) 
(Jamestown Foundation, 2012).   
4.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
Using the militant groups in Mali as an example, this chapter demonstrates the 
methodology of partitioning and evaluating signed social networks.  The model 
identifies four different partitions out of 877 that provide the best depiction of how the 
groups are interrelated.   This methodology allows intelligence analysts the ability to 
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focus in on these specific partitions in order to analyze inconsistencies within the 
network.  It also suggests potential influence targets.  Inconsistencies can potentially 
identify errors in classification of a relationship or identify relationships that are 
vulnerable to change.  The relationship that the model found that was most likely to 
change in this illustration was the AAD/MNLA relationship.  The recent splitting of AAD 
into two groups, demonstrates the model identified a relationship that was under 
tension and had a high likelihood of changing.  In the next chapter new actors are 
introduced to the model and the relationships are identified based on more current 
events.   The new network is then evaluated using the same methodology to draw 
conclusions about the actors and their relationships in the new Malian operating 
environment.
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5 Mali Militant Groups Case Study Post-French Intervention 
5.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapter delineated key actors participating in the conflict in 
Northern Mali prior to 11 January 2013.  This chapter provides a second illustrative 
example to explain how the methodology could be used to decompose and begin to 
comprehend a complex relational situation.  This example considers the relations of key 
actors in Northern Mali over the period of 11 January to 11 February.   The two models 
are then compared in Chapter Six where conclusions and recommendations are 
presented on the methodology and future work. 
 In the beginning of January, the Islamic extremist forces began moving south, 
out of the desert region, into Southern Mali.  The provisional Malian government, 
unable to stop the militants themselves, asked France for support.  The French entered 
Mali on 11 January and, after initial loses, began defeating the extremists.  By February 
all of the main cities of Northern Mali were regained by Malian, French and other forces.  
Other than France, the international ground forces are from African nations supported 
by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the operation is 
classified by the United Nations as the African-led International Support Mission in Mali 
(AFISMA).  The other major addition to the key actors from the model in Chapter Four is 
the creation of the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA).  The IMA has split off of Ansar 
Al-Din and created a separate organization.  This chapter adds the three new actors 
(French forces, ECOWAS forces, and the IMA) to the model from Chapter Four to assess 
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how the intervention has affected the structural balance of key actors within Northern 
Mali.  Modeling the actors in this way enables analysts to identify the cliques and 
subsets within a network, relations vulnerable to change, and potential mediators 
between subsets. 
5.2 Key Actors 
  This study explores the relations between ten actors (three new actors and 
seven original actors) evaluated in the Chapter Four model.  With the involvement of 
French and ECOWAS forces as well as the establishment of a new group, the IMA, this 
model is expanded to address the added complexity of the situation.  The ten key actors 
are listed in Table 10.  Arab militias and Patriotic Forces of Resistance (FPR), from the 
Chapter Four model, are included in this revised model as well.  The Arab militias seem 
to be maintaining a low profile.  Very little open source information is currently being 
released on their involvement in the conflict.  Therefore the only relationships that are 
assessed on the Arab militias are their cultural and historic negative relations between 
themselves and the MNLA and FPR.  The FPR relations are assessed to be exactly the 
same as the Malian government, as their goals are to defeat the rebellion and support 
the government.  The relations of the other actors are discussed in subsections 5.2.1 
through 5.2.6.  An overview of all actors is displayed in Table 10.   
 5-3 
 
Table 10: Key Actors of Post-French Intervention in Mali 
 
5.2.1 National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). 
 With the French and Malian military success in Northern Mali, the once 
marginalized MNLA has once again become a key player within the Tuareg community.  
They maintain the same relations with the previous actors, disliking AQIM and MUJAO 
for terror and extremist reasons, Arab militias and FPR for cultural and historic reasons, 
and the Malian military due to a long history of conflict and distrust.  The MNLA 
continue to have a complicated relationship with AAD.  This study still classifies the 
Number Group Ideology Goal Ethnicity Area of Operation Like Dislike
1 MNLA Secular A secular, independent 
government in Azawad
Primarily Tuareg Kidal 3,8,9 2,4,5,6,
7
2 AQIM
Extreme 
Islamic
Establish an Islamic 
Caliphate throughout 
Muslim world
Algerian leadership, 
African participants
Timbuktu/ 
Dispersed across 
Northern Mali
3,4
1,6,7,8,
9,10
3 AAD Extreme 
Islamic
Establish an Islamic 
State of Mali with 
Primarily Tuareg leaders, 
other ethnic participants
Kidal/Timbuktu 1,2,4,
10
6,7,8,9
4 MUJAO
Extreme 
Islamic
Establish an Islamic 
Caliphate throughout 
Muslim world
Mauritanian leader, 
African participants Gao/Menaka 2,3
1,6,7,8,
9,10
5 Arab 
Militias
Islamic Defend and protect 
there own interests
Arab Lere/Timbuktu 6 1,7
6
Malian 
Govt Secular
Regain control of their 
territory and defeat the 
rebel movement
Bambara, Peuhl, Senufo, 
Songhai, Dogon, Malinke 
and others
Mopti, Sevare
5,7,8,
9
1,2,3,4,
10
7 FPR Secular
Regain control of lost 
Mali territory and defeat 
the rebel 
movement/Revenge
Songhai, Peuhl, Bozo, 
Bella and others
Originally Gao and 
Douentza, moved 
south when 
Islamists took over 
6,8,9
1,2,3,4,
5,10
8 French 
Forces
Secular
Reduce the terrorist 
threat in the 
region/Regain Mali's 
sovereign territory
French All of Mali
1,6,7,
9,10
2,3,4
9 ECOWAS 
Forces
Secular
Reduce the terrorist 
threat in the 
region/Regain Mali's 
sovereign territory
African All of Mali
1,6,7,
8,10
2,3,4
10 IMA Islamic An Islamic Autonomous 
region in Northern Mali
Primarily Tuareg Kidal 1,3,8,
9
2,4,6,7
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relationship as positive due to the Tuareg ties between the organizations, but the 
segmenting of the moderate IMA’s from AAD has resulted in a weaker connection 
between the MNLA and AAD.  The MNLA has positive ties with the three new actors in 
the model.  As the AFISMA forces regained control of the cities in Northern Mali, the 
MNLA allowed the French to enter, but told the Malian military to stay out of the city of 
Kidal (Harding, 2013b).  The IMA, like the MNLA, is a Tuareg organization and is likely to 
maintain close ties, at least at the leadership level, with the MNLA.  The ideological 
difference between the two organizations is that the MNLA is secular and the IMA is 
Islamic.  Both groups appear to be now seeking an autonomous Northern region of Mali 
as opposed to the MNLA’s original goal of independence.   
5.2.2 Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for 
Oneness and Jihad in W. Africa (MUJAO). 
 AQIM and MUJAO maintain the same relations with all of the same actors that 
were in the seven actor model of Chapter Four.  Both groups like AAD and dislike all 
other actors.  The new actors are all disliked by AQIM and MUJAO because the 
international forces have become involved in the conflict to defeat these terror 
organizations.  The IMA has renounced terrorism and may even be willing to fight 
against these organizations (Beaumont, 2013). 
5.2.3 Ansar Al-Din (AAD). 
 As of mid-February, Ansar Al-Din has continued to hold fast to its extreme 
Islamist ideology.  As a result, more moderate members of the organization broke off 
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from the group to form the IMA.  This demonstrates Ansar Al-Din’s power and prestige 
with the population of Northern Mali has suffered as the AFISMA forces took control of 
the populated areas.  AAD is still closely aligned with AQIM and MUJAO.  The strong 
Tuareg ties between AAD, IMA and MNLA result in this study classifying these 
relationships as positive.  AAD has negative ties to the French, ECOWAS, FPR and Malian 
government.  The AAD relationship with the Arab militias is not known and is therefore 
classified as null. 
5.2.4 Mali Government Forces. 
 The Malian government forces are still very weak and vulnerable.  While some 
Malian forces are assisting the French in the North, on 8 February in the capital, Malian 
troops were fighting each other.  The old presidential guard, still loyal to the overthrown 
president, was attacked by the unelected interim government forces (Harding, 2013a).  
In a time where their country is being assisted by foreign forces, the Malian army is 
unable to put aside their differences to participate fully in the fighting against the 
enemy.  This infighting and complications between Malian army units demonstrates the 
difficulties of classifying relationships as a whole.  While the infighting suggests the 
potential for future difficulties, this study assumes the Malian army is loyal to the 
interim government and supporting the AFISMA forces in deposing the Islamic 
extremists from control of Northern Mali.  Mali forces have positive relations with the 
French forces, ECOWAS forces and the FPR.  Due to ethnic and historical reasons, the 
Malian army has negative relations with MNLA and IMA.  It has negative relations with 
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AQIM, MUJAO and AAD as evidenced by the fighting taking place to remove the 
extremists from the country.  It is unknown how the Malian forces interact with the 
Arab militias, therefore that relationship is classified as null. 
5.2.5 African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). 
 The African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) is the combined 
international forces operating in Mali.  This mission was authorized by the United 
Nations in December 2012 and initiated in January when the French intervened in 
Northern Mali (February 2013 UN Monthly Forecast - Mali).  The French have repeatedly 
stated they want to turn the entire operation over to African forces to oversee a 
peacekeeping operation. A United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping mission could 
additionally be authorized to further support the international effort in Mali.  The 
AFISMA forces have favorable relations with the Malian government forces, the FPR, the 
MNLA and the IMA.  The MNLA and presumably the IMA have been supporting the 
international forces in Kidal and other strongholds against extremist forces.  AFISMA has 
negative relations with AAD, AQIM, and MUJAO.  Their relation with the Arab militias is 
unknown at this time and is therefore classified as null. 
5.2.6 Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA). 
 The Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA) is a splinter organization from Ansar Al-
Din.  Led by an important Tuareg tribal leader, Algabass Ag Intallah, they have 
renounced terrorism and extremism in favor of a negotiated peace to the Mali conflict 
(Beaumont, 2013).  The stated goal of the IMA is to set up an autonomous region in 
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Northern Mali with a moderate Islamic government.  Many of the Tuareg who 
participated with Ansar Al-Din were not known to be overly religious prior to joining the 
organization.  These moderates were willing to support Ansar Al-Din while AAD had 
increased power and influence throughout the later part of 2012. Once the French 
forces began defeating the Islamic extremists, the moderates of AAD saw a way out of 
the extremist organization that AAD had become, leading to the creation of IMA.  The 
IMA have the same relations as the MNLA.  They like AAD, the French, and the ECOWAS 
forces and dislike all other actors.   
5.3 Assessing Relationships between Actors 
 The previously identified groups and their relationships provide the basis for the 
analysis in the next two sections.  The relations between these groups are shown in the 
matrix in Table 11 and the network graph in Figure 23 are based on the observations 
presented in sections 4.3 and 5.2.  It should be noted that the relationships in this 
illustrative example are the assessment of the author, based on open source literature.  
Actual relationship values should be reviewed and updated by regional, cultural and 
subject matter experts.   
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Table 11: Mali Actor’s Relationship Matrix (Post-French Intervention) 
 
 
Figure 23: Network Graph of 10 Actor Network (Post-French Intervention) 
 Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996) 
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5.4 Partitioning Actors into Subsets 
5.4.1 Generalized Blockmodeling 
As the number of actors in a network increases, the network graph can begin to 
appear cluttered and illegible, clouding the ability of an analyst to make any conclusions.  
It is precisely this problem that this thesis is designed to address.  With ten actors, there 
are 115,929 different partitions possible.  Using the relocation method and generalized 
blockmodeling, Table 12 identifies the minimum number of inconsistencies and the 
number of different subsets with that minimum number of inconsistencies.   
Table 12: Minimum Inconsistencies for 10 Actor Model using Relocation Method 
 
 In this network, the minimum number of inconsistencies in a partition is six.  
There are six inconsistencies when the network is partitioned into two, three and four 
partitions.  When partitioned into two, there is one way to partition the network to get 
six inconsistencies.  There are four ways to partition into three subsets and three ways 
to partition into four subsets to get six inconsistencies.  Therefore there are eight 
partitions identified that have the minimum number of inconsistencies.  These eight 
partitions should be evaluated in closer detail to determine which of them best 
represent the real world situation.  In each of these eight situations there are six 
relations that do not support social balance theory.  See Figure 24 for the network 
graphs of the eight different partitions identified.   
# of subsets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Minimum # of Inconsistencies (Criterion Function) 22 6 6 6 7 9 10 13 15 16
# of possible different subsets with Minimum # of Inconsistencies 1 1 4 3 3 10 2 10 16 1
 5-10 
 
 
Figure 24: The graphs for the eight different partitions with six inconsistencies for the 
ten actor network.  Graph A is partitioned into two subsets.  Graphs B, C, D, and E are 
partitioned into three subsets.  Graphs F, G, and H are partitioned into four subsets.    
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996) 
 The number of times a relationship over all the partitions in Figure 24 is 
computed.  The relationships that are identified as inconsistent the most often are the 
ones that are responsible for the tension in the network as it is currently defined.  As 
shown in Table 13, the MNLA/AAD and IMA/AAD relations are inconsistent in six out of 
Negative Relation
Positive Relation
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the eight blockmodels.  These relations should be reanalyzed to determine if they are 
correctly observed or if there is unusually high tension for them to change.  These 
relations are under stress, but the MNLA and the IMA have clearly stated their 
disapproval of the terror and extremism that AAD endorses.  However, these groups are 
all Tuareg and it is difficult to consider their relations negative despite the current 
tension and opposing alliances.  These relationships identify AAD as the link between 
Tuareg organizations and the Islamic extremists.   
 The next relationships that appear often are the MNLA and IMA’s relations with 
the French and ECOWAS forces.  These relations are identified as inconsistent half of the 
time.  When considered with the previous inconsistencies of the MNLA and IMA’s 
relations with AAD, it is obvious that the MNLA and IMA are being pulled in two 
different directions.  Either they align with the international forces or they align with 
AAD.  The MNLA and IMA appear to have the option to be the mediator between the 
two groups or join one of them and oppose the other.  As conditions exist in mid-
February, the MNLA and IMA appear to be taking the mediator approach.  They want to 
be included by the international forces in any agreement and shaping of the future of 
Northern Mali.  Since an outright alliance with AAD at this time means being allied with 
AQIM and MUJAO, the MNLA and IMA are unlikely to increase ties to AAD at this time.  
However, the existing cultural ties between the Tuareg in MNLA, IMA, and AAD will not 
disappear and need to be monitored as the situation changes.  It is likely that 
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individuals, both leaders and fighters, will flow between the organizations as one or 
another organization gains power and influence. 
Table 13: Number of inconsistencies by relationship occurring in the eight identified 
minimum inconsistency blockmodels from the 10 actor network. 
 
5.4.2 Relaxed Blockmodeling  
Since there are such a high number of minimum inconsistencies, relaxed 
blockmodeling should be conducted to investigate if a better partitioning can be found 
when constraints are relaxed.  When Relaxed Blockmodeling is conducted on the ten 
actor network, the network can be partitioned into five groups with no inconsistencies.  
Relationship
# of times 
relationship was an 
inconsistency out of 8 
blockmodels
MNLA/AAD 6
IMA/AAD 6
MNLA/ECOWAS 4
IMA/ECOWAS 4
MNLA/French 4
IMA/French 4
MNLA/Mali Govt 2
IMA/Mali Govt 2
MNLA/FPR 2
IMA/FPR 2
FPR/French 2
FPR/ECOWAS 2
Mali Govt/ French 2
Mali Govt/ ECOWAS 2
AQIM/AAD 2
MUJAO/AAD 2
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Table 14 provides the minimum inconsistencies for the 10 actor network using Relaxed 
Blockmodeling.   
Table 14: Minimum Inconsistencies for 10 Actor Model using relaxed blockmodeling 
 
 This method identifies zero inconsistencies when the network is partitioned into 
five subsets.    See Figure 25 for the relaxed blockmodel and Figure 26 for the network 
graph of the ten actor network with five subsets. 
  
Figure 25: Relaxed Generalized Blockmodel for the ten actor network partitioned into 
five subsets with zero inconsistencies.  
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996) 
# of subsets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Min # of Inconsistencies via Relaxed Generalized Blockmodeling 16 6 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
# of possible different subsets with Minimum # of Inconsistencies 1 1 2 1 1 8 19 19 9 10
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Figure 26: Network graph of ten actor network partitioned based on the Relaxed 
Blockmodeling method.   
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996) 
Since there are no negative blocks on the diagonal and zero inconsistencies, the 
network can be reduced without losing any information.  By partitioning into the five 
subsets identified by relaxed blockmodeling, the graph is reduced from 10 nodes to five 
nodes, resulting in a simplified network.  This smaller network allows for quicker 
calculations and easier to understand observations.  The reduced network is shown in 
Figure 27. 
Negative Relation
Positive Relation
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Figure 27: Reduced Network graph from ten nodes to five nodes.   
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996) 
 
 The reduced network allows for some simple observations to be made.  First, it 
shows AQIM/MUJAO and Mali Government/FPR each have one positive relationship.  
Additionally, it shows the other three subsets each have two positive relationships.  Any 
of the actors that have two positive connections could be considered mediators 
between the subsets they connect.  For example, if the French wanted to negotiate or 
pass a message to the Ansar Al-Din group, it is likely they could do this through MNLA or 
IMA and vice versa.   
 If the reduced network identified by Relaxed Blockmodeling is analyzed for 
structural balance, five different partitions can be identified with the minimum number 
of inconsistencies of two, see Table 15.   
Negative Relation
Positive Relation
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Table 15: Minimum Inconsistencies Identified by the Reduced Network 
 
 
Figure 28: Five different partitions of the reduced network, each having two 
inconsistencies.  Graphs A and B are partitioned into two subsets, Graphs C, D, and E 
are partitioned into three subsets.   
Graph by author using Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1996) 
The five different partitions of the reduced network are simplifications of the eight 
different partitions identified in the full network.  There are five partitions instead of 
eight because the Arab Militant groups have been combined with AQIM and MUJAO and 
cannot be partitioned into their own subset after being combined.  In looking at the five 
different subsets, A and E seem to be the best partitions based on what is happening in 
Mali.  Partition A may make sense for the initial phases of the foreign intervention.  The 
# of subsets 1 2 3 4 5
Minimum # of Inconsistencies (Criterion Function) 6 2 2 3 4
# of possible different subsets with Minimum # of Inconsistencies 1 2 3 4 1
Negative Relation
Positive Relation
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MNLA and IMA have supported the international forces and have even captured high 
profile members of MUJAO and AAD (Ramzi, 2013), leading one to believe they should 
be in the group with the International and Malian forces.  However, partition E may be a 
better long-term partition of the reduced network because the MNLA/IMA will work 
with international forces, but may not work with Malian forces due to mutual distrust.  
The AFISMA forces are in Mali to assist the government, therefore their first loyalty 
must be to the government forces, making E a more logical partition. 
 There are three unbalanced triads in each of the partitions in Figure 28, all have 
two positive and one negative relation.  AQIM/MUJAO, AAD, and MNLA/IMA are one 
triad, AAD, MNLA/IMA, ECOWAS/French is another, and Mali government/FPR, 
ECOWAS/French, and MNLA/IMA is the third.  These types of unbalanced triads can 
become balanced by the negative relation turning positive or one of the positive 
relations turning negative.  Essentially if any relation in the triad changes, it becomes 
balanced.  While these triads remain unbalanced there is tension between the three 
actors involved.  The only actor involved in more than one unbalanced triad is 
MNLA/IMA; therefore they are under the most pressure to change their relations.  
However, this also puts them in a position to mediate between the two major subsets, 
once again making partition E the likely partition for the post-French intervention 
network. 
Assuming that partition E is the best partition for the real-life situation in Mali 
and that no additional key actors will enter the network, there are three options to 
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make partition E balanced.  The MNLA/IMA is shown as a mediator between the two 
larger groups; the Islamic militants on the top part of the graph and the International 
forces on the bottom.  MNLA/IMA can create a balanced network by making their 
relations to both AAD and ECOWAS/French negative (isolating themselves), they can 
make their relation negative to ECOWAS/French and positive to AQIM/MUJAO (joining 
the Islamic groups), or they could make their relation negative to AAD and positive to 
Mali government/FPR (joining the International forces).  Contrary to social balance, the 
author does not foresee any of these changes taking place.  Instead, the MNLA/IMA is 
likely to try to enhance its role as mediator between the groups and strengthen its 
position as an intermediary.  Acting in this role provides the MNLA/IMA with influence 
and control over negotiations and governance.  Therefore tension within the network is 
likely to continue.   
5.5 Additional Social Network Analysis 
 Just as was done in section 4.6, the popularity measures likes minus dislikes, a 
ratio of likes over total relations, and eigenvector centrality are used to evaluate the ten 
actor signed network.  Recall that these are different popularity measures.  Likes minus 
dislikes counts the number of positive and negative relations each actor has and 
subtracts them.  The ratio measure divides the positive relations by the total relations to 
provide a percentage of friends for each actor.  The actors with higher, more positive 
values are more popular.  The values are listed in Table 16.  Although these measures do 
not take into account the strength of the actors, it does provide an indication of the 
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popularity of the actors based on the actors included in the model.  The larger a 
network is, the less susceptible the likes minus dislikes and ratio of likes measurements 
are to actors omitted from the model.  If the assumption is valid that the more popular 
an actor is, the more influence they have on the network, then the actors that score 
higher on pure popularity measures (likes minus dislikes and ratio of likes) are the most 
influential within a network.  Since these two measures do not take into account who 
the relationship is with, as eigenvector centrality does, the actors that score high on 
these measurements can influence the most actors.  Alternatively, eigenvector 
centrality identifies the actors that influence the most popular actors. 
Table 16: Popularity measures of actors (Post-French Intervention): Likes minus 
Dislikes and Ratio of Likes/Total relations (sorted from highest to lowest) 
 
Militant Group
Likes 
minus 
Dislikes
Ratio: # 
Likes 
over 
Total 
Relations
French Forces 2 0.63
ECOWAS Forces 2 0.63
AAD 0 0.50
IMA 0 0.50
MNLA -1 0.44
Malian Govt Forces -2 0.38
Arab Militias -2 0.00
FPR -3 0.33
AQIM -4 0.25
MUJAO -4 0.25
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When comparing the popularity of individual actors in Table 16 to the same actors 
in Table 8, the Pre-French intervention network, the results seem to be reversed.  
Instead of the Islamic groups being the most popular, they have become the least 
popular.  This makes sense since all three of the new actors added to the model are 
anti-Islamic extremists.  The exception to this is AAD.  AAD is surprisingly still popular 
according to these measures even though they are most associated with the two least 
popular groups.   
Eigenvector centrality calculates an increase in popularity of an actor if they have 
a positive relation to a popular actor or a negative relation to an unpopular actor and a 
decrease if they have a negative relation to a popular actor or a positive relation to an 
unpopular actor.  Eigenvector centrality of the ten actor network is shown in Table 17. 
Table 17: Eigenvector Centrality of actors (Post-French Intervention) 
 
Militant Group
Eigenvector 
Centrality
French Forces 0.398
ECOWAS Forces 0.398
FPR 0.339
Malian Govt Forces 0.328
MNLA 0.129
IMA 0.118
Arab Militias -0.076
AAD -0.28
AQIM -0.398
MUJAO -0.398
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The order of Table 17 is similar to Table 16 except AAD and FPR have flip-flopped 
positions.  This is because FPR is positively connected to the most popular actors and 
negatively connected to the most unpopular actors while AAD is positively connected to 
the most unpopular actors and negatively connected to the most popular actors.  The 
eigenvector centrality rankings, when grouped, provide the same partition as identified 
via the partition we identified in Figure 28E.  At least according to these two illustrative 
examples, the eigenvector centrality measure provides not only a popularity measure 
but also a potential partitioning of the actors.  More analysis should be conducted to 
determine if this is the case in other types of examples.  The approach outlined here, 
however, does suggest an area to focus future research efforts. 
5.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
Taking the influential militant actors in Northern Mali from 11 January to 11 
February 2013 as an example; this chapter analyzes the positive and negative relations 
and makes some observations about the subsets and mediators within the network.  
Additionally, specific relations are identified as causing tension to the network based on 
social balance theory.  Generalized blockmodeling found eight out of 115,929 possible 
partitions that minimized the inconsistencies in the network according to social balance 
theory.  Relaxed Blockmodeling was then used to reduce the network from ten actors to 
five.  These five actors were blockmodeled a second time finding five partitions that 
minimized the inconsistencies.  These five partitions were analyzed to determine the 
most likely partition to fit the example.  It was determined that there are likely two main 
 5-22 
 
subsets, the Islamic extremists and the International forces.  Additionally, the 
MNLA/IMA were found to be the probable mediators between the two subsets.  
Popularity measures were calculated to identify influential actors within the network.  
These measures found the popular actors from Chapter Four (the Islamic extremists) 
were not popular in this network and the unpopular actors became much more popular 
due to the inclusion of the additional actors.
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6 Findings and Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the overall contributions of the research methodology 
to the operational and academic communities, reiterates the results of the research 
from Chapters Four and Five, and presents recommendations for future research. 
6.2 Contributions of the Research 
This research provides a methodology to analyze signed networks based on 
social balance theory.  It identifies a way to partition a signed network to identify likely 
subsets within the network.  Unique actors and relationships are pinpointed based on 
inconsistencies or imbalances within the network.  Inconsistent relationships are more 
likely to change than other relationships because there is increased tension between the 
actors involved.  Identifying this tension provides analysts with insight into the 
complexities of the network and potential relationships in which to influence.  These 
relationships can be targeted to stabilize or destabilize a network. 
The model can be used by analysts to analyze an array of different real world 
situations.  For example, if data is available on like/dislike tribal relations in a region of 
interest, this model could aid in identifying the sources of tension within that area of 
operations as well as the popularity of the actors, identification of allied groups, and the 
actors that can mediate between those groups.  Another possible application is the 
militia groups currently operating in Libya.  Since only some are friendly to the 
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government and all have varying feelings toward each other, these relationships could 
be modeled to gain additional insights into the web of relationships.  A third application 
is the complex relations of the different opposition groups operating within Syria.  These 
groups are disjoint and have competing goals and ideologies, making the network 
difficult to dissect without this methodology.   
Another interesting application would be to assess the relations between the 
international forces assisting in Mali.  All of the different countries providing troops may 
have conflicting relations between each other and the local population.  Positive and 
negative relations need to be considered in any type of international humanitarian or 
support mission.  In whatever application, increased knowledge about how these groups 
relate to each other can provide important information to aid U.S. decision making 
within a region of interest.  
6.3 Results of the Research 
 The two illustrative examples provided in this research assess the conflict in Mali 
from January 2012 to 11 January 2013 (Pre-French Intervention, Chapter Four) and from 
11 January 2013 to 11 February 2013 (Post-French Intervention, Chapter Five).  The first 
example identified the relationship between Ansar Al-Din and the MNLA as being under 
particularly high tension to change.  After the French intervened, the Ansar Al-Din group 
split in two; one group stayed with the Islamic extremist subgroup and the other group 
(IMA) became allied more closely with the MNLA.  This split was likely due to the tension 
identified by employing the methodology on the Chapter Four model.  In the post-
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French Intervention example of Chapter Five, two main subsets were identified; the 
Islamic militants and the International forces.  The MNLA/IMA is a third subset and 
determined to be the mediator between the two main subsets.  It is likely the Malian 
government will be reliant on the International forces and the MNLA/IMA to help them 
fight the Islamic militants for the foreseeable future.  This provides the MNLA/IMA the 
ability to leverage this role to achieve more autonomy for the Tuareg in Northern Mali. 
6.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
 This research offers a starting point for the modeling and analysis of signed social 
networks with military applications. There are many plausible areas to expand this 
methodology with future research. 
 While this methodology advances analysis by evaluating signed network data, it 
would be useful to assess the strength of the tie in addition to the sign.  Instead of just 
having -1, 0, and 1 as tie strength, it would provide much more insight if the strength of 
tie could be any continuous number from -1 to 1, where the extremes are strong 
relations and zero is no relation.   Having continuous numbers would essentially weight 
the tie putting more confidence and importance on relations that are known to be 
stronger.  While the examples used in this research did not take into account directional 
relations, the methodology does support the ability to analyze directional ties. 
 Assessing signed dark networks is possible using this methodology as well.  
However, relations between certain actors within dark networks are often times 
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unknown.  If a partial signed dark network is known, unknown relations could be 
propagated using techniques similar to Guha et. al. (2004).  In this manner potential 
relations could be hypothesized to populate the unknown parts of the network.  As 
relations are revealed, the network can be updated for better results.  If results do not 
match what is predicted by the network, sources of tension, mediating parties, and 
alliances could be identified through inconsistencies in the network. 
 This methodology identified specific relations and actors that were unique to the 
network in order to decrease conflict within the network.  In other words it attempted 
to identify ways to make the network more stable.  However, this methodology could be 
altered to identify ties that are vulnerable in order to make a network less stable.  Less 
stable enemy networks can slow down the enemy’s ability to act.     
6.5 Conclusions 
 The United States military is often called to operate in unknown places 
throughout the world.  Each place has its own unique set of actors and web of relations 
between those actors.  This research provides a methodology for assessing complicated 
relationships in a setting where conflict is evident by assessing the positive and negative 
relations between key actors.  Groups of actors, mediators and relations vulnerable to 
change can be identified to provide insight into complex networks.  It provides another 
tool in the analyst’s repertoire to assist in identifying key relations and suggesting 
potential causes of action.
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